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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this master thesis is to (i) describe the developments in the Abkhazian 
Conflict1 from the Rose Revolution (November 2003 – January 2004) to the present day, 
and (ii) point out why the conflict is now more difficult to solve through negotiations 
than at the outset of the period under analysis, through (iii) mapping out the extent to 
which the parties can do without a negotiated agreement and (iv) the level of tensions 
between them. That the conflict is more "malign" now than at the time of the Rose 
Revolution was not as obvious at the time I started writing, but recent events have made 
it clear worldwide that this mainly forgotten issue is an increasingly "hot potato".  
 The condition of the Abkhazian Conflict is is relevant not only for those who are 
directly involved, it also have global consequences: The latter years' increasing tension 
between Russia and the EU/NATO countries has a focal point in the relationship 
between the Post-Soviet republic of Georgia and its great northern neighbour. While 
Georgia is neither a member of NATO nor the EU, it has been very open about its 
"Western" orientation since the revolution that brought Mikheil Saakashvili to power, and 
has deepened its relationship with these IGOs. Hence, conflicts between Moscow and 
Tbilisi have a tendency to spill over into Russia's relationship with these two 
organizations. The Abkhazian Conflict has established itself as the most unstable of the 
disagreements between the two states, as seen in recent news, and events there may cause 
ripples spreading far away from the narrow strip of Black Sea coast that is Abkhazia. 
 However, this thesis is not an analysis of Georgian–Russian relations concerning 
Abkhazia; it is about the conflict between Georgia and the self–proclaimed Republic of 
Abkhazia. The regional great power games and the basic conflict affect each other in a 
mutually reinforcing way, and while the total picture emerges only after incorporating 
both "levels" of the conflict, there simply is no room for this within an MA thesis. Thus, 
my focus is limited to the local level, where we find the original core of the matter – not a 
conflict between resurgent Russia and an expanding NATO, but a conflict between a 
small state and one of its provincial minority populations. I will of course note the 
                                                 
1 Defined here as the conflict between Georgia and the self–proclaimed Republic of Abkhazia over controlling Abkhazia. 
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opportunities and limitations imposed on these parties by the great powers involved, but 
not delve into the reasons for their actions. 
 While leaning on earlier works on the subject I have also thoroughly studied news 
reports; documents from IGOs, NGOs and educational/informational institutions; and 
spoken/written statements by important actors. The online news-sites Civil Georgia, 
Kavkaskiy Uzel and Lenta have been particularly important for mapping out interactions 
and finding key texts.2 Such texts have also been found through analysis of books written 
by actors, e.g. Tamaz Nadareishvili's book on the Abkhazian War and the book by Taras 
Shamba/Aleksandr Neproshin on the foundations of Abkhazian statehood.3 Finally, I did 
field work in Abkhazia November 16–25 2007 - in Abkhazia's capital and in the region 
where most of the returned refugees from the war live. I interviewed representatives of 
different communities, NGOs and the authorities – and also got ample opportunities to 
meet and talk with people who knew much about the conflict. The interviews have been 
treated both as sources to facts, and for analysis of local attitudes to important issues. 
Due to the inherent risk in getting the facts from people involved in the conflict, I have 
found confirmation from second sources in such cases.  
 The approach to analysis applied in this thesis has made it necessary for me to 
gather data on demography, economy, military structures, formal rights and the internal 
political constitution of the actors. Throughout the information gathering process I have 
several times encountered the problem of contradictory sources. These five topics are 
highly political, and many see an interest in exaggerating or minimizing figures – or 
keeping them secret. For this reason I have on occasion been forced to list alternative 
figures (demography) or present data which is neither complete nor accurate (military 
power). Still, the data I have gathered give a correct enough impression that one may 
draw conclusions regarding the effects of these factors on the conflict. 
 Two other problems I have faced when writing about this conflict are complexity 
and change. Firstly, not only is this conflict highly complex, but my method of analysis in 
itself demands a lot of room. I originally wanted to incorporate some of the "upper level" 
                                                 
2Civil Georgia has English translations, while all texts from Kavkaskiy Uzel and Lenta have been translated from Russian by 
the author. 
3Nadareishvili led the bloc Democratic Abkhazia up to the days of the war, and was later the leader of the Government of 
Abkhazia in Exile (GAE). Shamba originally campaigned for Abkhazia to secede from Georgia and join the USSR, and in 
the early 1990s wrote a famous proposal for a federation treaty between Abkhazia and Georgia. He is also an elder brother of 
former Aidyglara Party leader and current Min. of Foreign Affairs Sergey Shamba. Chervonnaya, Svetlana: Conflict in the 
Caucasus. Georgia, Abkhazia and the Russian Shadow. (Gothic Image Publications 1994), p. 57–58, p. 109. 
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of the conflict by treating the Russian Federation (RF) as an object of study, but 
eventually had to treat it exclusively as an explanatory variable and not a dependent 
variable. Secondly, the conflict has recently reached an extremely high level of tension. 
When I started writing the situation was tense but still frozen. These days, outside 
observers fear war. I have tried to include recent developments, but due to time 
constraints data collection ended on May 6 2008. 
 Finally, language proved a puzzle since words are political, and I strive for neutrality. 
Abkhazia's capital is called Akwa in Abkhaz, Sukhum in Russian and Sokhumi in Georgian; 
the easternmost region of Abkhazia is Gali to the Georgians but Gal to the Abkhaz; and 
what the Republic of Abkhazia (RA) refer to as Upper Kodori was renamed Upper Abkhazia 
by Georgia (RG)4 in 2006. I will refer to these places by the names applied by the UN:  
Sokhumi, Gali and Upper Kodori. Regarding transcription, Abkhaz names are transcribed 
as one would usually transcribe Cyrillic instead of using the "Georganized" forms that are 
sometimes applied. This is because the Abkhaz themselves use a modified version of the 
Cyrillic alphabet, and not the Georgian Mkhedruli alphabet.5 
 I will start off this thesis by giving an overview of my theoretical approach (Ch. 2), 
and then move on to define the desired utilities of the parties by mapping out historical 
interactions and discourses on history (Ch.3). Following this, I will give an overview of 
data relevant to the conflict regarding demography (Ch. 4), economy (Ch. 5), military 
capabilities (Ch. 6), recognition and rights (Ch. 7) and social cohesion (Ch. 8). I will then 
move on to describe interactions between the parties with a particular eye to patterns in 
conflict intensity (Ch. 9) before I conclude by determining what constellations of 
BATNAs and intensity have been seen in the period under analysis and pointing out 
some key factors causing the conflict to become more malign (Ch. 10). 
 
2. Theoretical approach: Desires utilities, BATNAs and Intensity 
2.1. Group formation 
Identity is at the core of all conflicts, in the sense that there cannot be conflicts without 
groups that oppose each other, and all groups are identity–based – social constructs 
created through what Umberto Eco calls cultural agreement,6 i.e. the groups exist because 
                                                 
4 There is no conventional or formal long form of the country's name. Since "the Republic of" is sometimes used, my 
abbreviation for this party will be "RG." 
5 E.g. "Gvindzhiya" and "Khadzhimba" for Гвинджия and Хаджимба, instead of "Gunjia" and "Khajimba."  
6 Heradstveit, Daniel and Bjørgo, Tore: Politisk kommunikasjon. (TANO AS 1996, 2nd edition), p. 33 
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the individuals that they consist of perceive them to be there. The groups in the 
Abkhazian conflict are states (de facto or de jure); organisations claming a monopoly of 
violence and taxation on a certain territory, and run by elites that base themselves upon 
the (voluntary or forced) cooperation of a certain population. These populations contain 
core nations – ethnic groups that are somehow seen (and identify themselves) as the 
foundation of the state. The core nations of the RA and the RG, the Abkhaz and the 
Kartvelians,7 have in common that they have experienced a period of nationalism–fuelled 
war during the formative period of their contemporary nation–states. In the book Modern 
Hatreds, that concerns the construction of nations/ethnoses and causes for "ethnic wars", 
Stuart J. Kaufman accounts for three main theories about the formation of ethnoses and 
the rise of nationalism: Instrumentalism,8 primordialism and constructivism.9 The first 
one is associated with rationalist approaches to analysis, and argues that ethnic groups are 
formed on the basis of common interests, and often actively created by elites that wish to 
exploit them as instruments of power. Constructivism agrees with instrumentalism that 
nations are social constructs, but does not see rational pursuit of material interest as 
necessary for such groups to arise. Primordialism, on the other hand, claims that 
individuals’ ethnic identities are given and rather unchangeable. However, Kaufman 
quotes primordialism’s founder Clifford Geertz as agreeing that ethnic identity is socially 
constructed, but emphasing that there is a limit to its "plasticity".  
 Kaufman promotes what he calls the symbolist synthesis, in which nations are seen as 
social constructs but the process of construction as limited by the need for "symbolic 
claims [to] seem credible and relevant": The individuals of the proposed group must prior 
to construction be anchored in common myth–symbol complexes that ethnic entrepreneurs 
utilize. "Myth" in Kaufman’s vocabulary does not imply that the implicated view of 
history is false, only that it is a view of history that has a certain importance: For example 
giving group X ("us") the role of "perpetual victim," and the group Y ("them") the role of 
"perpetrator." Due to the connotations of falsehood, I will instead apply "historical 
                                                 
7"Abkhaz" here refers to the ethnic group, their culture and language; whereas people and matters concerning the 
geographical territory of Abkhazia will be referred to as "Abkhazian."  "Kartvelian" refers to the groups speaking Kartvelian 
languages (see 3.1) as their mother tongue, whereas people and matters concerning the geographical territory of Georgia 
(including the breakaway republics) will be referred to as "Georgian." In matters concerning the political units, the 
abbreviations "RA" and "RG" will be used. Please note that direct quotes do not necessarily follow these rules, as these 
distinctions are not in common use – I only use them here for clarity.  
8 Kaufman, Stuart J.: Modern Hatreds. The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Cornell University Press 2001),  p. 17. 
9 Kaufman 2001, p. 23. 
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discourse" for Kaufman's concept. A discourse is defined as a "web of meaning" where 
concepts are given certain values and placed in relation to each other. The sum of 
conflicting discourses on a certain subject is referred to as a "discursive order", while what 
is outside all discourses – that is, never brought into the debate – is said to be in the "field 
of discursivity." Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Lacleau refer to the "spinning" of such 
webs as "articulation",10 and text or speech that articulates the content of a certain 
discourse is often called a "representation". Thus, it is possible to say that all nations are 
discursive groups – they are constituted by acceptance of certain discourses. "Symbol" means 
an "emotionally charged shorthand reference to a myth",11 and may be places (e.g. 
battlefields) objects (flags, relics, buildings) or even famous historical events where the 
content of the myth is concentrated. By mentioning or displaying symbols, a speaker 
invokes the myth/discourse associated with it, and may thus call forth certain behaviour 
from the listener. This is akin to what Louis Althusser’s calls "interpellation" ― a speaker 
addresses the audience with monikers that make them naturally assume certain roles 
("subject positions") and proceed to behave in ways associated with this role.12 Such "role 
behaviour" may entail treating other people not on the basis of their individual traits and 
actions, but based on the relation you see their group as having to your group. Such 
"collectivization of agency" may in extreme cases completely cancel out the perpetrator's 
idea of her/his own individuality and that of the victim ― thus preventing feelings of pity 
or responsibility. 
While accepting the symbolist synthesis, I wish to emphasise that objective groups do 
exist and matter: Economic classes, inhabitants of certain regions, users of certain 
languages, men and women etc. – all these groups exist objectively, and membership in 
them will constrain actors and/or give them certain opportunities – whether or not they 
realise that they are members of the group. If people ignore constraints imposed by 
objective group membership, their actions will simply be frustrated or punished. But 
manifest conflict does not occur until somebody perceives a distinction between themselves 
and others on the basis of myth–symbol complexes and draw certain conclusions from 
this perceived divide. 
                                                 
10Winther Jørgensen, Marianne and Phillips, Louise: Diskursanalyse som teori og metode. (Roskilde Universitetsforlag 
1999), p. 36 
11 Kaufman 2001, p. 17 
12 Jørgensen and Phillips 1999, p. 25; Culler, Jonathan: Literary Theory – A very short introduction. (Oxford University Press 
2000), p. 45. 
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2.2. Desired utilities, rationalism and constructivism 
The division of goods between objectively existing groups may be glaringly unjust, but at 
least one party must perceive the situation as undesirable for manifest conflict to arise. The 
basic thing is, again, that people start perceiving that there are different groups in society: 
That "they" possess something you desire, or threaten it, is unthinkable until you perceive 
"them" to exist. Following this, you need to perceive it as impossible to control the 
desired utility (dU) to a level of satisfaction unless the other is forced to give up some 
control of it. The dUs will be defined by accounting for historical discourses and the 
parties' positions and actions throughout the conflict. 
This approach to actor formation and defining desires is in line with the approach 
to analysis of international relations commonly known as constructivism: Actor preferences 
are seen as endogenous to social interaction (not exogenous) and there is an emphasis on 
the myth/discourse–driven construction of Selves and Others.13 However, Fearon and 
Wendt argue that such practices do not actually run counter to rationalism, the approach 
to analysis often presented constructivism's opposite.14 Fearon and Wendt suggest that 
one should differ between thick and thin rationalism. The first assumes actors’ desires to 
be material and egocentric, and oriented towards material security/gains.15 Thin 
rationalism, on the other hand, does not assume anything about the desired utilities of 
actors.16 This line of thought sees rationality as lying not in the nature of the actors’ 
desires but in their processes of reasoning (see 2.3). Thin rationalism, then, does not run 
counter to the idea that groups and their desires are constituted through processes of 
social construction. Also, endogenizing may be causal or constitutive: Causal endogenizing 
seeks to answer the question "where does the actor come from, why does it have its’ 
qualities?" and is associated with rationalism, while constitutive endogenizing asks "what 
are the actors’ socially conditioned possibilities at the moment?" and is associated with 
constructivism.17 What I do in Ch. 3 is to causally endogenize the parties in order to define 
                                                 
13 Wendt, Alexander and Fearon, James: Ch. 3: Rationalism v. Constructivism. A Sceptical View; in Carlsnaes, Walter; Risse, 
T. and Simmons, B. A: Handbook of International Relations (SAGE Publications 2002), p.  53. 
14 Rationalism versus constructivism was claimed to be the "great debate" of contemporary IR theory in the 50th anniversary 
edition of International Organization, eddited by Keohane, Krasner and Katzenstein. (Carlsnaes, Risse and Simmons 2002, 
p. 52). 
15 Fearon and Wendt in Carlsnaes, Risse and Simmons 2002, p. 59. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Fearon and Wendt in Carlsnaes, Risse and Simmons 2002, p. 62 – 63; Checkel, Jeffrey T: 3. Constructivist Approaches to 
European Integration in Jørgensen, Knud Erik; Pollack, Mark and Rosamond, Ben J.: Handbook of European Union Politics 
(SAGE Publications 2007), p. 4 (of Ch. 3). 
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their desires in the conflicts, while my analysis seeks to map out what socially and 
materially conditioned possibilities and restraints form the basis for their actions 
Constructivists who engage in causal endogenizing are often accused for sinning 
against the ontology of mutual constitution:18 The idea that actors shape their social reality 
by interacting with each other, but at the same time they are shaped by that social reality – 
everything and everyone are constantly "under construction." It is seen by many as 
incoherent to "freeze" the ideational structures, saying "these are the parties’ desires", and 
proceed to account for parties’ interactions and the consequences of these; because 
mutual constitution does not actually stop after the researcher has "frozen" the ideational 
structures – in reality the construction goes on while the researcher holds it constant. This 
"freezing" is an analytical simplification at best, an inexcusable meta–theoretical error at 
worst. Rationalism, on the other hand, adheres to methodological individualism. It focuses on 
an individual actor with certain desires, pursuing a goal rationally under certain 
constraints.19 This approach does not run counter to causal endogenizing, but it is not in 
line with the holist ideal of constructivism – that actors must not be emphasised on the 
behalf of the social structures they operate within.   
I find myself having to agree with the constructivist ontology that actors and social 
structures are constantly constructing each other, but even so the basic narrative in this 
thesis is one of methodological individualism: There are certain actors, they have desires 
that I define by way of causal endogenizing, and they pursue them rationally in the light of 
certain constraints and opportunities. I find it necessary to approach the subject in this 
way simply because of the question I am asking in this thesis: Why is the Abkhazian conflict 
more difficult to solve now than prior to the Rose Revolution? To answer this I need to contrast the 
Control–Intensity Structure 2004 with that of 2008, and examine what events caused the 
situation to change. I am aware that I am ontologically speaking "mixing apples with 
oranges" in the words of Jeffrey T. Checkel,20 but I am willing to make this trade–off 
between maintaining total ontological correctness on the one hand and answering my 
research question in the way I find most practical and rewarding on the other. 
 
                                                 
18 Fearon and Wendt in Carlsnaes, Risse and Simmons 2002, p. 62 – 63 
19 Note that "individual actor" may, and often does, mean anthropomorphic actors. Caporaso, James A.; Checkel, Jeffrey T. 
and Juphile, Joseph: Integrating Institutions. Theory, Method and the Study of the European Union. (SAGE Publications 
2003), p. 12; Elster, Jon: Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. (Cambridge University Press 1989), p. 13 
20 Jørgensen, Pollack and Rosamond 2007, Ch. 3 p. 4 
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2.3. Rationality and actor behaviour 
Jon Elster defines rationality in a way corresponding to thin rationalism, saying that it 
consists of "finding the best means to given ends," understanding "best means" as those 
based on beliefs that are "optimal, given the evidence available" and collecting evidence 
thoroughly, yet not so thoroughly that the chance to act disappears.21 Elster's core 
criterion for rationality is that beliefs may not be directly influenced by desires.22 He grants that it 
is impossible for your choice of action not to be affected by desires at all, but within 
rationality the force of desire cannot override your beliefs about what is the benefit–
maximizing course of action (see Fig. 1).  
 
Fig. 1: Elster's model of rationality. 23 
Rationality, then, is when actors follow the logic of 
consequences. Constructivists, on the other hand, often 
argue that actors apply the logic of appropriateness. If the 
first can be summarized in the formula [desired utility] + 
[rational belief about how to best pursue desired utility] = [action], the logic of 
appropriateness could be expressed as [situation] + [images;interpretations;norms] = 
[action]. A new situation (a change in the BATNA–Intensity structure and/or a move by 
the other party) is interpreted by an actor, and the ensuing action is governed by what is 
seen as the right thing to do.  
My take on what generally goes on when a party in conflict reacts to a given 
situation is a combination of the two logics: (i) In most situations when a group does not 
have to act immediately and without discussion, the proper course of action will be debated – if 
not in society at large, then at least among decision makers. (ii) The situation will be 
interpreted as threatening control over some desired utility and/or providing an 
opportunity to increase control over it (or, of course, be interpreted as irrelevant). During 
deliberation on the situation, rational means–ends calculation will occur, but (iii) certain 
courses of action that would objectively be possible may be outside the field of 
discursivity – or be seen as principally inappropriate or inappropriate in the situation. This 
results in a form of bounded rationality (see Fig. 2). 
 
                                                 
21 Elster 1989, p. 24 – 26 
22 E.g. wishful thinking, ignoring evidence, or stopping research at a convenient point. (Op. Cit, p. 37) 
23 Adapted from Op. Cit, p. 31 
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Fig. 2: A model of bounded rationality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X’s discourses/myths 
includes Self- and Other-
constructions that lead to 
certain understandings of Y’s 
actions; and also include the 
basic desires that the situation 
is interpreted as 
threatening/giving an 
opportunity to secure. 
Change in BATNA 
and/or conflict intensity 
Y acts 
Debate on the situation 
leads to the formation of 
situational desires 
(“What do we want in 
this situation”?). The  
course of action to be 
taken is debated under 
rationality bounded by 
appropriateness and the 
field of discursivity, 
X’ actions are subsequently 
interpreted by Y, and also 
evalutated by subgroups 
within X itself. – causing an 
internal dynamic within X. X’ 
action may or may not cause a 
change in BATNAs and/or 
conflict intensity. 
 
 
Elster argues that rationality may be hampered by the need to act rapidly, and frustrated 
by a number of other reasons: E.g. different courses of action may seem equally 
good/bad, or it may be difficult to predict outcomes for some reason. In these situations 
pure "coin–flipping" may kick in and decide what action is to be taken.24 While 
acknowledging this, I will generally assume the bounded rationality described here to be 
the operating mechanism.  
 Naturally, X' discourses/images regarding Y may be glaringly wrong. It is not given 
that X correctly understands what YdU is, or what Y's situational desire is, or what Y finds 
to be "appropriate." This may cause X to react in a fashion that has completely 
unforeseen consequences, possibly only for X, if Y's situational desire was to have X walk 
into a "trap", but maybe also for both. This may very likely cause tensions to spin out of 
control, as Y may not have intended to provoke X and the parties end up in a situation 
where both believe that the other party is aggressive and can not be trusted. 
 Finally, one needs to ask the question "who are acting?" In a situation where X 
seems to be acting towards Y in ways you would not expect, it can turn out that a subunit 
of X (a ministry, paramilitaries etc) is acting unilaterally. This subunit may be acting to 
secure dUs other than XdU, have different situational desires due to divergent discourses, 
or harbour other norms that cause them to act differently than X (i.e. the subunit of X 
that is supposed to have control over X' actions) would have done. If such a subunit is 
                                                 
24 Elster 1989, p. 30–41. 
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seen to constantly have major effects on the situation, one should consider including 
them into analysis as both explanatory variable and dependent variable – in order to 
determine what drives them. Finally, it can be unclear who is acting because the parties 
point their fingers at each other. However, in such a situation the researcher is seldom 
able to do more than make a qualified guess at best – particularly if the conflict, like this 
one, is ongoing and not historical, so the actors whose lies must be uncovered still have 
power to prevent it. 
  
2.4. BATNAs, Intensity and their sources 
William Mark Habeeb divides power into behavioural power and structural power, where 
the last is subdivided into aggregate power and issue power. Behavioural power practice 
(rational, tactical behaviour) is defined as acts oriented towards altering "the issue power 
basis" 25 in favour of the acting party. Aggregate power is defined as military, economic 
and demographic resources, plus "the social cohesiveness, the stability of political 
processes and decision–making" and "national spirit".26 Habeeb argues, however, that the 
analyst’s focus should be on issue power since all depending on the concrete conflict, 
certain aggregate resources may be of less practical value than one may otherwise 
assume.27 Aggregate power, then, is mostly relevant as a basis for issue power, by Habeeb 
defined as the alternatives X has to securing XdU based on a "relationship other that with 
the opposing actor", the control X has over XdU (i.e. the degree to which X can secure the 
XdU unilaterally) and the commitment X has to securing XdU without reaching a negotiated 
agreement (NA) with Y.28 In this thesis I will somewhat reformulate Habeeb’s concepts: 
Control and alternatives will be discussed under the common moniker "Control (over 
dU)," and I will specify when necessary if the actor’s control is unilateral or borrowed – 
stemming from an alternative, which could be a third party (Z) or in the worst case Y. 
The current level of control over XdU plus its potential for forcibly capturing XdU, 
determines X’ best alternative to negotiated agreement with Y – commonly abbreviated as 
BATNA.29 XBATNA will be seen as improving when the status quo control over XdU 
                                                 
25 Habeeb, William Mark: Power and Tactics in International Negotiation. How Weak Nations Bargain With Strong Nations. 
(John Hopkins University Press, 1988), p. 25–26 
26 Ray Cline quoted in Op. Cit, p. 17. 
27Op. Cit, p. 18. 
28 Op. Cit, p. 21–22. 
29The term was launched by Roger Fisher and William Ury. (Hopmann, P. Terrence: The Negotiation Process and the 
Resolution of International Conflicts. (University of South Carolina Press, 1996), p. 57). 
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increases despite absence of a negotiated agreement (NA), and/or when there is an 
increase in X' potential for securing control over XdU through coercion. If XBATNA is 
satisfactory, the likelihood that X will be interested in reaching NA drops – why negotiate 
when you have what you need? A bad XBATNA, on the other hand, means that X may find 
it quite opportune to negotiate: The end result may quite possibly mean more control 
over XdU than X presently possesses – particularly if X and Y find a way to increase 
control over their dUs jointly, through integrative bargaining.30 When exactly a party will 
feel "satisfied" is of course a difficult question to answer. Arild Underdal defines 
satisfaction as completely subjective – "the actor's own notion of what he 'deserves' (...) 
'needs' (...) or is 'entitled to'.31 In this thesis, XBATNA will be defined as unsatisfactory if X 
has none or little control over XdU and no or little capability to gain control through 
military means; and/or there is an obvious tendency of X losing status quo control or 
potential for seizing control over XdU. 
 Commitment, which will be referred to as intensity in this thesis, stems from the 
ideational structures that shape the actor: High intensity is a product of fear and distrust 
of Y, impatience, and/or ideologically or religiously fuelled overconfidence in the abilities 
of one's own group. A high Xint results in lack of will to compromise or even 
communicate with Y. A conflict can have high intensity, low intensity or be imbalanced – 
if, e.g. Xint is very high but Yint rather low. High intensity may frustrate attempts at 
agreement: If X believes itself to be under existential threat from Y, does not trust Y, or 
believes that Y can not win; it will probably be very difficult to make X concede much – 
or even show up in the first place. A high Xint can keep X from negotiating, even if 
XBATNA is so low than one would assume any rational actor to willing. 
Many factors may serve to raise/lower Xint or create better/worse XBATNA. In this 
thesis I have analytically placed them in five groups: Demography, economy, military 
power, rights and recognition, social cohesion and interaction. The last factor is akin to 
what Habeeb refers to as behavourial power – "the exercise of power" through "a 
combination of verbal statements and non-verbal acts".32  Interactions are defined here as 
actions made by X and Y that affect the other five factors, and through that possibly 
                                                 
30 Op. Cit, p. 59 
31Underdal, Arild: Ch. 8: Designing Politically Feasible Solutions; in Malnes, Raino et al & Underdal, Arild (Eds.): 
Rationality and Institutions. Essay's in Honour of  Knud Midgaard on the Occasion of his 60th Birthday, February 11, 1991. 
(Universitetsforlaget 1992), p. 229).  
32 Christer Jönsson quoted in Habeeb 1988, p. 23. 
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change X/YBATNA and X/Yint. Note that contrary to the definition of behavioural power 
practice, interactions need not have been performed with the intent to change anything in 
the conflict at hand – indeed, their effect on X/YBATNA and X/Yint may be unplanned.  
 
Demographic constitution of the actors 
The demographic constitution of  X (XD) have a deep an basic impact on both X/Yint and 
X/Y’s potential for control as it has a strong effect on the other sources of power. Most 
notably it affects military and economic potential, but also XS (social cohesion): Say, e.g. 
that the territory of X has a sizeable population of some group that for some reason do 
not support the state of X much. This element of XD affects social cohesion negatively. 
Furthermore, the size of the population represented by (or at least controlled by) X may 
impact to what extent it is recognized: It will be more difficult to ignore a several millions 
strong region than one with 50.000 inhabitants.  
 Of course, a small population does not automatically translate into a low level of 
control, it may even be a source of strength: If the core nation of X has a very strong 
demographic position (i.e. they vastly outnumber that of Y), this may raise Yint as it 
heightens their fears for X – and cause them to seek compensation for this, e.g. by allying 
with a strong third party or otherwise enhancing their military capabilities, with the result 
that Y eventually becomes stronger than X despite their demographic disadvantage.  
 Another way that demography may empower a party is trough the phenomenon of 
potential hostage populations: If X has the possibility to punish a part of Y’s core nation easily 
(e.g. because a minority of it lives on X–controlled territory), that lowers YBATNA – Y 
cannot attempt securing YdU by causing harm to X, without risking that punishment of 
their kin ensues. The existence of a potential hostage population on the territory of X may 
also raise YInt by raising Y’s desire to control the "Y–nation" minority's habitat. 
 I will see the following factors as weakening the XD-related potential for control 
over XdU: That the group around which the state or statelike entity X is based, is generally 
small in size; that this group is a minority within X' general population; and this group is 
outnumbered by the constituent group of Y. I will hold it to increase the XD-related 
potential for control if the opposite is true, and if they have access to a potential hostage 
population. 
 
Wealth and economic structures of dominance 
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Capital is probably the most flexible of the "factors": It can often be used as a direct 
means of obtaining dU; be directed towards increasing military capabilities; in a "loop" 
effect be invested in future economic gain; be thrown at social problems; and in some 
cases even provide an actor with increased recognition or rights – through corruption or 
through the mere fact that wealth is difficult to ignore). Both Marxist and Neoliberal 
scholars have emphasised the importance of economic structures in international 
relations. Marxist theorists such as Vladimir Lenin33  and Immanuel Wallerstein have 
written extensively on the existence of centres and periphery in the international chain of 
production. There are several sources of conflict to be found in this "class system of 
states": Imperialist wars that are either simply "plunderous"34 or for opening territories to 
dump residual capital, competing centre–periphery systems rivalling over territory, and 
periphery revolts.35  
 Economic dependency of X on Y is a matter of aggregate structural power, but it 
naturally influences any specific conflict between them. Thus, economic dependency of X 
on its adversary Y will be seen as making XBATNA worse, and economic dependency of X 
on Z will also be seen as lowering XBATNA somewhat, as Z may itself become an opponent 
over time, or cut a deal with Y. Here, however, one should optimally analyse Z to find out 
how likely it is to do so. Economic dependency and available capital is referred to jointly 
as XE. 
 
Military capabilities 
This factor that can hardly be ignored in conflict analysis, at least in situations where the 
parties see it as appropriate to apply military means – and in the Abkhazian conflict the 
parties have had such ample opportunity to learn that violence may prove decisive: The 
Kartvelians took Sokhumi. by sheer military force, holding it until the Abkhaz returned 
with Russian weaponry. If XM (military power) is in a good state relative to YM, this gives 
them the upper hand in case negs (negotiations) break down and the use of military 
                                                 
33 Baylis, John and Smith, Steve: The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations. (Oxford 
University Pres 2006), p. 231. 
34 Doyle, Michael: Ways of War and Peace. (W.W. Norton 1997), p. 349. 
35 This is not a purely Marxist insight. Joseph Schumpeter, a main theorist of Commercial Peace, describes commercial 
imperialism ("export monopolism") as a situation where states, under the influence of wealthy groups, push for forceful 
opening of new markets so that residual capital may be invested there. Schumpeter, though, argues that this crude way of 
finding markets is due to states not being Capitalist enough, but he admits that throughout history "bourgeois 
commonwealths" have been "aggressive when it seemed to pay". (Doyle 1997), p. 245 – 246, 350–352). 
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means become possible. Even if XM is not good enough that X can secure control over 
XdU unilaterally, they have powerful means to punish Y.  
 Hence, if XM is high relative to YM this raises XBATNA and lowers YBATNA. If X’ 
military power is borrowed from Z, this of course reduces the quality of XM. However, if 
the latter is the case on should also map out the likelyhood of Z seizing to borrow its 
strength to X. 
 
Recognition and rights 
This socially constructed source of control is highly relevant in many conflicts – not the 
least conflicts where one party is an unrecognized BR. Recognition and rights are per 
definition borrowed power – you can not give yourself recognition and rights, they must be 
bestowed upon you by actors whose doing this will be respected due to law or 
convention. If X’ struggle to control XdU is seen as legitimate by a majority of, or all, 
entities that can bestow such legitimacy upon them, the XR situation will be seen as very 
good. But even lacking recognition to control XdU ("aggregate" recognition), X may have 
other formal or conventional rights that in practice render X certain measure of control 
over XdU ("issue" recognition). E.g. being recognized as a party in the conflict, and given a 
place at the relevant tables, gives possibilities for behavioural power practice that may 
weigh up somewhat for X’ lack of formal rights to XdU. XR may heavily affect X’ abilities 
to borrow power, as Z may face reactions if it bestows military or economic power upon 
an "outcast." 
 If recognition of X' right to XdU is found to be low or non-existent at the 
"aggregate" level (in this case, the recognition bestowed upon the parties by other states) 
this quite clearly reduces XBATNA in the case that reaching NA would provide them with 
such recognition. However, the "issue" recognition will also be mapped out through 
investigating the arrangements made around the conflict. Also, the extent to which formal 
rights have practical effects will be noted. 
  
Social cohesion 
The social cohesion of X (XS) is a particularly important factor as it decides the extent to 
which X can effectively utilize its organization, claimed territory and population towards 
increasing/maintaining control over XdU – and also determines to what extent X can 
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focus on the conflict instead of internal affairs. This is naturally relevant when 
determining XBATNA: XS problems may lead X to spend so much time and resources on 
maintaining its mere existence (or at least the existence of the elite currently controlling it) 
that it gets less free hands to pursue increased control over XdU. Also, social cohesion 
affects Xint: X’ ruling elite may whip up the popular mood against Y by utilizing pre–
existing intensity (hostile discourses) in order to save their own necks, and internal 
oppositional groups may do the same – e.g. by accusing the ruling elite of being "soft on 
Y" or even co–opted by Y. Raised Xint may spawn behaviour that in turn causes Yint to be 
raised, causing a downward spiral of interactions. But notably, XS may also cause a 
conflict to disappear completely: Through extensive internal changes, an elite may come 
to power in X that does not consider XdU to be desirable, thus removing the reason for 
conflict (high XdU may cause general hostilities between the two to linger on, though). 
There is, however, an inherent instability in this kind of "solution": If internal events 
cause X’ interest in Xd to return, and X now has weaker control over XdU than prior to 
the détente, X may turn revisionist. 
 When mapping out XS I will check the popularity enjoyed by the current 
leadership of X, and judge XS to be improving if the popularity increasing – and vice 
versa. I will also look at to what extent X is having difficulties related to the demographic 
situation, and note such difficulties as having a negative impact on XS. The general well-
being of this sector will be seen as directly affecting XBATNA, since major internal social 
problems tend to cause less capacity for dealing with external conflicts. 
 
Interactions: Manifest conflict 
Finally, we have the factor of interactions. All the preceding factors form a basis on which 
the parties act, and their actions again change the other factors. For that reason, it is rather 
difficult to analytically separate interrelations from the other five factors: To explain how 
and why f.ex XE became worse during the period under analysis, we may have to bring in 
certain interactions between X and Y. I will spend one chapter on a general walkthrough 
of interactions between the parties since the Rose Revolution, with a particular eye to its 
effects on the conflict's intensity. Conflict intensity will be seen as increasing if the parties 
are seen to have problems negotiating, and/or if a party engages in actions (rhetoric, 
accusations, military moves) that are seen to provoke the other side. If the parties on the 
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other hand increasingly discuss relevant issues in a somewhat constructive manner, refrain 
from provocative actions and/or are seen trying to find joint solutions – this will be seen 
as lowering conflict intensity.  
 
2.5. Evaluating the conflict 
Several analysts focus on the nature of actors’ desires when judging the extent to which a 
conflict is malign: P. Terrence Hopmann emphasises the extent to which parties’ desires 
overlap or not;36 and Bruno Coppieters refers to increasing divergence between 
"identities and interests" as "negative” transformation.37 Identity divergence does have a 
role in this thesis (it is covered by the concept "increased conflict intensity") while interest 
divergence will not be as much focused upon – I do not find that the basic desires of the 
parties change substantively in the period. My main focus when evaluating the prospects 
for reaching an NA in the Abkhazian Conflict will be on BATNAs and intensity.  
                                                
• A good XBATNA will lower X's incentives to enter negs over XdU. It also may lower 
Y's possibilities to concede during concession–convergence bargaining:38 If Y does 
not control XdU at all, it will have nothing to offer unless it proposes a trade–off.39 A 
bad XBATNA, on the other hand, means that X could possibly gain control from negs 
through trade–offs or by negotiating integratively – i.e. working jointly towards 
increasing control over dUs.40 
• Low conflict intensity increases chances that the parties are being willing to 
participate in negotiations and creates good conditions for compromising or even 
persuading. High conflict intensity moves the parties in the opposite direction, with 
possibilities of escalating the conflict into violence. Integrative negotiation may be 
impossible under high conflict intensity. 
In the matrix below are some proposed properties and hypothetical scenarios that could 
occur under different BATNA-intensity constellations. These are of course 
generalizations, since "satisfaction" and "intensity" are not dummy variables – they are 
always present in degrees. Also, what kind of control the parties are in possession of is 
important –  military or economic, borrowed or unilateral, etc? 
 
36 Hopmann 1996 p. 25 
37 Coppieters, Bruno: The EU and Georgia: time perspectives in conflict resolution. (Occassional paper Nr. 70, December 
2007; EU Institute for Security Studies 2007), p. 28 
38Distributive bargaining where the parties concede in turns until they step-by-step have "converged". (Hopmann 1996 p. 59) 
39 Y attempts to have X allow it more control over YdU by proposing to give X control over XdU2 (a different desire of X). 
40 Hopmann 1996 p. 47. 
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Fig. 3: Possible properties of BATNA-intensity constellations 
 High intensity conflict Intensity imbalance Low intensity conflict 
XBATNA and 
YBATNA 
increasingly 
satisfactory 
If both parties are content with 
the current level of dU-control 
(i.e. the high BATNA does not 
stem from military potential to 
capture the dU) the conflict of 
interests is in fact over. 
However, high intensity can be 
enough to keep general 
hostilities going until one party 
experiences a loss of 
satisfaction. If the parties' 
BATNAs are high due to 
military power, fear and 
overconfidence in own power 
may also lead the parties to 
attack instead of accept the 
status quo. However, if military 
power is equal this may lead 
rational parties to not enter full-
scale war despite high intensity. 
The less hostile party (X) 
would be more likely to take 
steps toward tension 
reduction. Y would be 
difficult to persuade, and its 
actions could rapidly 
heighten Xint. This is an 
unstable situation. Still, there 
are few incentives to act 
aggressively, except for 
preventive/preemptive 
reasons. 
 
If both parties have fully 
satisfactory BATNAs and 
intensity is very low, there is 
little reason for conflict. But 
satisfaction is a matter of 
degrees, so the parties may 
still enter into integrative 
negs to maximize control 
over dU. 
 
BATNA 
imbalance (X 
satisfied, Y 
unsatisfied) 
X now has the self–confidence 
to negotiate, but may lack 
incentives – particularly since 
Yint is high and Y therefore is 
difficult to deal with. The 
generally high conflict intensity 
means that Y may be quite 
unwilling to negotiate, and that 
X is inclined to force them to 
do so – possibly through an 
outright attack and military 
victory. If XBATNA is satisfactory 
mainly due to military power, 
this and not actual control over 
the dU at the present time, this 
increases chances of a military 
strike. The CI-structure in any 
case causes a bad negotiation 
climate, and possibly a dictated 
NA that does not solve much. 
Also, Y may out of fear and 
frustration act aggressively to 
capture more control over YdU 
and/or weaken X' control over 
XdU. 
 
(A) A situation where Xint is 
high and Yint low, is not likely 
to last long: Yint will most 
probably be raised quickly 
due to X' behaviour – 
particularly if it constitutes a 
potential military threat. Y 
may play a constructive role 
in attempting to take the first 
step towards intensity 
reduction. 
(B) If Yint is high and Xint 
low, X may be generous in 
negotiations – particularly if 
X somehow feel that Y have 
a right to what they are 
demanding, we could be 
looking at a conflict that will 
be solved easily. But X will 
not necessarily want to 
negotiate, and Y's actions 
could cause Xint to rise. 
X may have self–confidence 
enough to enter negs, and 
low Xint may cause them to 
do this despite few 
incentives. The weaker party 
will have good reason to 
enter negs, and low Yint will 
make it easier for them to 
do so. 
 
However, if the parties E– 
and/or S–levels are very 
low, the situation in the 
region may be volatile even 
if agreement is reached. 
Failure to deal with 
economic and social 
problems immediately 
following the reaching of 
NA may cause upheaval, in 
which intensity may rise 
again to rise again and renew 
the spiral of conflict. 
 
XBATNA and 
YBATNA at 
unsatisfactory 
levels. 
This situation is unstable due to 
both parties being discontent 
with the status quo, and 
intensity being so high as to 
The highly intensive party 
has an incentive to attack, 
while the less intensive party 
may play a constructive role 
Unsatisfactory BATNAs 
mean that the parties have 
much to gain from entering 
negs, and the low intensity 
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 frustrate negotiations. The 
parties may choose violent 
means to "solve" the conflict. 
In a situation of low military 
capabilities, the chances for war 
are narrower ― but such power 
could be borrowed. If the 
parties control each others dUs, 
a trade–off is possible. High 
intensity, however, may 
frustrate reaching such an 
arrangement. If the parties do 
not control neither their own 
nor the others' dU – there is 
little to negotiate about. 
 
in attempting tension 
reductions. If the highly 
intensive party (X) is not 
seen as posing a real military 
threat to Y, it will be easier 
for Y to be steadfast in 
working for negotiations. 
 
level makes constructive 
negotiations possible. 
However, if the parties are 
so weak that they can not 
give each other anything, 
there are little incentives to 
negotiate. 
 
 
While everything in practice is dependent on the concrete facts of the individual conflict, 
I will generally assume the following simplified values for different tendencies regarding 
BATNAs and intensities; where “unstable” is to imply that the tendency is destructive and 
“progressive” implies that it is constructive. 
 Intensity rising Imbalance Intensity falling 
Equally satisfied Rather unstable Somewhat unstable Highly progressive. 
Imbalance Highly unstable. Dependent on 
constellation: (B) is 
somewhat  progressive 
and (A) is somewhat 
unstable. 
Rather progressive. 
Equally dissatisfied Rather unstable Somewhat unstable. Rather progressive 
 
 
3. Parties and interests  
3.1. The groups and their historical interrelations 
The Abkhaz are the largest of the Northwest Caucasian-speaking nations.41 All other such 
nations have their traditional homelands in the North Caucasus (NC), which is inside the 
RF today. The Georgian nation is a conglomerate of subgroups speaking Kartvelian or 
South Caucasian languages, which are unrelated to Northwest Caucasian. Most Georgians 
speak dialects of Kartuli, and it can be argued that Kartuli-speakers are the "real" core 
                                                 
41 Often collectively called Circassians, a term more correctly applied to the Adyghe  peoples of the Russian republics 
Kabardino-Balkariya, Karachay-Cherkessiya and Adygeya. The Abkhaz-Abaza and the Ubykh are often also called 
"Circassians," though. (www.circassianworld.com/Circassians.html). The Abaza are close ethno-linguistic kin of the Abkhaz 
who inhabit Kabardino-Balkariya, and the Ubykhs originally lived in today’s Sochi region. An example of the broader usage 
of the term can be found in Shenfield, Stephen D.: The Circassians – A forgotten genocide?  in Levene, Mark and Roberts, 
Penny (Eds:): "The Massacre in History" ( Berghahn Books 1999 and 2006).  
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nation of the RG. However, the northwest of de facto RG42 is dominated by Mingrelians 
and Svan; Kartvelian languages that are incomprehensible to Kartuli-speakers but still use 
the Georgian written standard.43 The Abkhazian Kartvelians (AKs) predominantly belong 
to these groups ― the Mingrelians concentrated in East Abkhazia,44 the Svans in Upper 
Kodori. 
 The region today called Georgia has throughout the millennia seen many borders 
and many rulers, often being divided into a western and an eastern sphere.45 Around 1000 
CE46 local forces threw off the rule of the Seljuks, and a state often referred to as 
"Medieval Georgia" was gathered by an Abkhazian dynasty.47 The reign of Queen Tamar 
(1184 – 1212) is considered its Golden Age.48 But this Abkhaz-Kartvelian state soon fell 
apart and was split between the Ottomans (West) and the Safavids (East).49 The Russian 
Empire (RE) entered the region in the 1700s, and had absorbed it by the latter 1800s. The 
Kingdom of Kartli-Kakhetia signed a treaty with the Russian Empire in 1783,50 but their 
"protector" abolished the state in 1801 and made it part of Russia as Tbilisi guberniya51 
while Samegrelo52 and the Kingdom of Imeretia became Kutaisi guberniya.53  
 In Abkhazia the RE's arrival split the nobles among those who wanted an 
Abkhazian autonomous principality under the RA, and those favouring the Ottomans. In 
1810 the conflict ended with Abkhazia becoming a Russian protectorate.54 But when the 
Circassian Wars ended in 1864, RE authorities removed the dynasty.55 Two major 
rebellions followed, which were put down harshly: A large portion of the Abkhaz 
population (mainly the Moslems) was exiled to the Ottoman Empire along with other 
Northwest Caucasian nations ― an event later called the Mahadzhirstvo. In 1883 Russia 
                                                 
42 De facto Georgia indicates Georgia minus the areas controlled by the Republic of South Ossetia (RSO) and the RA, and 
prior to the spring of 2004 also Ajara. 
43 Kaufmann 2001, p. 86 ― 87 
44 Abkhazians refer to areas SE of Sokhumi as "the East", and NE as "the West". 
45 The west has been known as f. ex. Colchis, Egrisi and Imerietia; the east as Iberia, Kartli and Kartli-Kakheti. 
46 CE means Current Era, BCE means Before Current Era. The terms correspond to AD and BC. 
47 Kaufmann 2001 p. 88, 95. 
48 Op. Cit,  p. 90-91 
49 Op. Cit, p. 88 
50 Svendsen, Inger Christine: Background paper. Prospects for return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to Abkhazia in 
Georgia. (NRC Internal document 2005), p. 31 
51 A guberniya was a province ruled by gubernatory, envoys of the Czar. 
52 The Mingrelians’ core territory, bordering Abkhazia in the southeas. 
53Coppieters, Bruno: Ch. 5: The Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict; in JEMIE.  Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in 
Europe, Issue 1/2004* (Asterisks mark that page numbers are unavailable due to the article having been found online, and 
that there is a URL to the article in the List of Literature).  
54 Svendsen 2005, p. 31 
55 Kolstø, Pål and Blakkisrud, Helge: Living with Non-recognition: State- and Nation-building in South Caucasian Quasi-
states in Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 60, No. 3, May 2008, p. 489 
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discontinued the administrative entity Abkhazia, making it part of Kutaisi gubernija. Due 
to the Mahadzhirstvo, there is an Abkhaz diaspora in Turkey today that may very well 
outnumber the Abkhazian Abkhaz.56 Areas left depopulated were occupied by Christian 
West Kartvelians. Though it is still a common idea that the Abkhaz are predominantly 
Moslem, the Mahadzhirstvo changed the balance and today 60% are Orthodox Christian, 
the rest Sunni Moslem.57 However, Monica Duffy Toft claims that pre-monotheist 
sentiments still live on58 and in any case the Abkhaz are rather secularist.59 In stark 
contrast, many Kartvelians see Orthodox Christianity as an essential feature of "being 
Georgian." A founding father of Kartvelian nationalism, Ilia Chavchavadze (1837-1907) said 
that Georgia was united by "Land, Language, Religion."60 These criteria exclude many 
groups with a long history in the region, f. ex. the Ajars who are Kartuli-speakers but 
Moslems – and thus seen by many as "a contradiction (…) an aberration that needs to be 
corrected".61 
 As the RE collapsed, chaos broke out in Abkhazia with a full pandemonium of 
Mensheviks vs. Bolsheviks, a short-lived Turkish invasion,62 rivalling state projects,63 a 
local border war between German-supported Georgia and Bolshevik Russia, and 
Denikin's "White Army" operating throughout the general chaos of Georgia. For a while 
Abkhazia was an autonomous part of the Menshevik Georgian Democratic Republic’s (GDR), 
but many Abkhaz wanted instead to be part of the Union of North Caucasian Mountain 
Peoples. Bolshevik Kartvelians in Moscow such as Iosif Stalin and Sergo Orjonikidze 
demanded military intervention, and in 1921 Bolshevik troops crossed the mountains. 
Two new Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) were declared: The Georgian SSR and the 
Abkhazian SSR, joined in a military, political and economic union.64 But in 1931, possibly 
a price paid for a "soft" process of collectivisation,65 Abkhazia was downgraded to an 
                                                 
56 Estmiates of Akbhaz in Turkey vary from 30.000 to 300.000. (UNHCR: The North Caucasian Diaspora in Turkey)*  
57 Svendsen 2005, p.59 
58 Toft 2003, p. 92. There's also one Catholic and one Protestant church in Sokhumi (located wall-to-wall with each other and 
the Orthodox church), though from what I learned the patrons of "Western" churches are mainly expat IGO/NGO workers. 
59 The Abkhaz secularism is also commented upon in Chervonnaya 1996, p. 14 – 15, 188 – 189.  
60 www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=8823 
61Monica Duffy Toft: The Geography of Ethnic Violence. Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory. (Princeton 
University Press 2003), p. 108. 
62 Kaufmann 2001, p. 88 
63 Lakoba, Stanislav: Ch. 7 Abkhazia, Georgia and the Caucasus Federation in Anchabadze, Yuri; Coppieters, Bruno; Nodia, 
Ghia (Eds): Georgians and Abkhazians. The Search for a Peace Settlement. (Vrije Universiteit Brussel 1998); Shamba, Taras 
and Neprosin, Aleksandr: Abkhaziya. Pravovye osnovy gosudarstvennosti i suvereniteta. (M.: OOO "In-Oktavo" 2005),  p. 81 
64 Svendsen 2005, full version, p. 32 -33 
65 Blauvelt, Timothy: Abkhazia: Patronage and Power in the Stalin Era  (Nationalitites Papers, vol. 35, Nubmer 2, May 
2007) p. 212 
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Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) within the GSSR. In the 1920s and 1930s, 
two patron-client networks rivalled for power in ASSR Abkhazia (ASSRA): That of the 
Abkhaz Nestor Lakoba and the Mingrelian AK Lavrenti Beria. The rivalry ended when 
Lakoba conveniently died on a visit to Beria in 1936,66 and the subsequent Great Purge of 
1937 took out most of Lakoba’s Abkhaz network.67 Beria’s people took over leading 
positions in ASSRA, and large-scale "Georgianization" ensued: Kartvelian culture was 
promoted,68 all Abkhaz schools were closed, the use of Abkhaz language banned,69 
standard Georgian became the official language, toponyms were made to sound 
Kartvelian,70 Kartvelians took over the majority of public positions71 and once more 
Abkhazia suffered massive colonization ― through forced resettlement of Mingrelians. 
Between 1939 and 1959 the AG population increased by 66.000 people.72 This local 
version of Stalinism is often called the Beriyevshchina after its Abkhazian-born enforcer. 
 After Nikta Khrushchëv had consolidated his power and denounced Stalin Abkhazia 
was host to several public displays of Abkhaz discontent, and in 1978 mass protests called 
for transfer of Abkhazia to Russia. The Kremlin answered by institutionalizing pro-
Abkhaz favouritism on cultural budgets and pre-determining certain government posts in 
ASSRA to the Abkhaz minority,73 who now became politically dominant.74 However, 
Soviet rule had set its mark:In 1989 78.8% of the Abkhaz held Russian to be their second 
language while vanishingly few claimed that standard Georgian had such a position75 - 
and according to International War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) up to 1/3 of the 
Abkhaz do not understand their national language.76 Russian had become the necessary 
lingua franca of a linguistically complex region. Of contemporary Abkhazia’s two TV 
channels one is Russian-language, and all the main newspapers are in Russian.77  
                                                
 
3.2. Rivalling constructions of history 
 
66 For different accounts about this event, see Blauvelt 2007.  
67 Blauvelt 2007, p. 216-217 
68 Toft 2003, p. 90. 
69 Kaufman 2001, p. 89 
70 Blauvelt 2007, p. 219, 221 
71Op. cit, p. 217. 
72Op. cit, p. 218 
73 Kaufman 2001, p. 89 
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RG history writing claims the Colchi Kingdom (6th Century BCE) that encompassed modern 
Abkhazia to be "the first Georgian state".78 According to Kaufman, there is an emphasis 
on struggles for liberation ever since the 7th Century's Arab conquest. Kartvelians and 
Abkhaz alike see "Medieval Georgia" as highly important. 79 Shamba and Neproshin refer 
it as "the Abkhaz-Imeretian Kingdom," denying that it was any kind of "Georgia," and 
articulate a firstcomer discourse that the "Georgians" (by which they seem to mean East 
Kartvelians) were not present in the SC until the 1200s CE, and did not become a 
nominal majority until RE bureaucrats erroneously applied the moniker gruzinskiy 
("Georgian") to groups such as Svans and Imerets.80 Likewise, they hold that the 
toponym Gruziya ("Georgia") was coined by the RE "for simplicity".81 Thus, the Abkhaz 
firstcomer discourse reduces the national identity that the RG is based on to a fake 
colonial construct. A Kartvelian discourse exists that constitutes a mirror image: The 
original Abkhazians were Kartvelians and today’s "Abkhaz" nation immigrated from the 
north in the 1600s,82 destroying the original Abkhazian culture.83 Nadareishvili articulates 
this construction, claiming that Kartvelian toponyms were altered or replaced when the 
NC tribes arrived.84 Nadareishvili insists, though, that the Kartvelian genome still 
dominates the population.85 In this discourse too, the Other’s identity is seen as a false 
construct of Russian colonialism: "Had the Abkhazs [sic] known their true history, they 
(…) would have remained patriots of Georgia".86 Thus, Abkhaz and Georgians base their 
origin myths on the same historical events, but construct them in ways that makes them 
mutually exclusive. The similarities between the Georgian construction of Abkhazia and 
the Serbian construction of Kosovo are interesting – the secessionist region is the cradle 
of the nation, occupied by foreigners. 
 The RE annexation is described by Nadareishvili as "eliminating [the] more than 
two millennia old statehood of Georgia"87, and the treaty-breaking character of the 
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inclusion is emphasised both by him and in Labyrinth of Abkhazia.88 As for the Abkhaz, 
they see the Mahadzhirstvo as a cataclysmic event. It is invoked as a major grievance in 
many interviews, and often linked with the Beriyevshchina, e.g. by RA Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs (Min. FA) Maksim Gvindzhiya:  
We cannot recreate the situation artificially created by the USSR. Abkhaz were deported to Siberia by 
Stalin and Berija, and Georgians moved in. And also this that happened in the 1800s (…) Because of 
this, eight [sic] times more Abkhaz live in Turkey than in Abkhazia. These two tragedies have created 
the background for the violent conflict..89 
But the inclusion into the RE is not per se seen as negative by the Abkhaz. Svetlana 
Chervonnaya quotes Abkhaz politicians that emphasise the voluntary character of the 
event.90 Shamba and Neproshin also do this,91 though they criticise the RE for 
discontinuing Abkhazian "statehood," the ensuing "colonial policy" of Mahadzhirstvo and 
government-driven ethnic swamping by "loyal" Mingrelians, Gurians and Cossacks.92 
Ghia Nodia claims that many Abkhaz see "Abkhazia as Russia"; though a majority 
probably agrees with the title of historian Stanislav Lakoba’s text Abkhazia is Abkhazia. In 
any case it seems that virtually no Abkhaz claim their homeland to be a part of Georgia. 93 
Gvindzhiya presents the same picture:  
No movement in Abkhazia would promote joining Georgia. Some in [Gali district] , of course. Some 
people want to be part of Russia, those that don’t understand… [Pause] …but they are not numerous, 
not at all. 94 
As for the events surrounding Abkhazia's inclusion into the USSR, Kaufman claims that 
Kartvelians see these events as the region voluntarily becoming a part of the GDR but 
subsequently being usurped by Bolsheviks ― a construction also represented in Labyrinth 
of Abkhazia.95 On the Abkhaz side, the Menshevik Abkhaz People’s Council that decided on 
the unification is often seen as "occupiers from the South."96 Shamba and Neproshin 
agree, saying that the GDR was guilty "occupation", causing "the interests of Moscow and 
the Abkhaz national liberation" to coincide.97  
                                                 
88Kholbaia et al. 2000, p. 7 
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Projects and Political Circumstances" in Coppieters, Bruno; Nodia, Ghia, Anchabadze, Yuri 998).  
94 Interview with Gvindzhiya, November 20 2007. 
95Kholbaia et al. 2000, p. 9-10 
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Beriyevishchina is frequently cited in Abkhaz history books98 and were also 
brought up in interviews. NGO activist Liliya Kvarcheliya explicitly invoked this and 
Mahadzhirstvo as reasons for Abkhaz fears:  
For many years their language was banned, they feel very worried. And the survival of the Abkhaz 
identity also. We were hoping that the Abkhaz would not feel so vulnerable [after the secession]. You 
know this entire story, you know it, about Stalin and Beria...?  (…) But after the war we were isolated. 
We are given medicine and such, but nobody helps us preserve the culture. So Abkhaz still feel 
vulnerable. Liberals say we should have a citizen-based Abkhazia, but the nationalists say that if so we 
will lose everything. They are still afraid that if we don’t have strong laws we will lose it all.99 
David Darchashvili writes that the Abkhaz saw Stalinism as "Georgian imperialism", and 
surprisingly seems to imply that the Abkhaz had a point: 
Frankly speaking, for many Georgians, the alteration of the demographic balance in Abkhazia 
represented a proper national objective. For the generation of our fathers and grandfathers, this was 
perceived as historical justice. But it is beyond doubt, that the Abkhaz society, carrying its own 
national ideas perceived everything in a different light.100  
When the situation was reversed to positive discrimination of the Abkhaz, this was not 
well received by Georgians. As Zeyno Baran writes in an open correspondence with 
Thomas de Waal: 
"The Abkhaz (...) experienced not oppression but disproportionate political power during the Soviet 
period – largely due to the communist regime's "divide and rule" policy. It was only natural for them 
to revolt after Georgia became independent – not to break out of their prison, but to protect their 
privileged position as the jailers."101 
Georgian nationalism first became a matter of mass politics during Mikhail Gorbachëv’s 
rule, but it was simmering under the surface. In 1978 the GSSR’s leadership wanted to 
make Russian a co-official language, but faced so fierce protests that GSSR First-Secretary 
Eduard Shevardnadze backed down ― something minorities saw as a dangerous 
concession.102 As Toft shows, the nationalist tendency was not only directed against 
Russian culture, but also against the minorities: A 1979 census caused great public alarm, 
as it showed certain minorities to have higher birth rates than those defined as 
"Georgians" – who had a 68.8%103 share of the GSSR’s population. One of the fast-
growing groups was the Ajars, and several suggestions were made for planned 
secularisation of them ― for had they not been Moslem, they would be "Georgians." This 
option was not available for several other minorities, such as the Abkhaz. 
 
3.3. Defining the desired utilities 
                                                 
98 Kaufman 2001, p. 96 
99 Interview with Liliya Kvarcheliya at the Centre for Humanitarian Programmes' office in Sokhumi, November 22  2007 
100 www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=8823 
101 Baran, Zeyno and de Waal, Thomas: Abkhazia-Georgia, Kosovo-Serbia: Parallel worlds.* 
102 Toft 2003, p. 94. 
103 Toft 2003, p. 91. Kaufmann points out that these fears were unfounded, as the percentage of "Georgians" in the GSSR 
actually increased from 60% to 70% in the period 1939-1989 (Kaufman 2001, p. 93). This serves to remind us that how 
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Escalation and war 1988 ― 94 
With Glasnost' came Georgian campaigns to end "discrimination" in the autonomies. 
These calls for simple majority rule in ethnically diverse regions coincided with a general 
pro-democracy mood and anti-Soviet desires for Georgian sovereignty. Abkhaz groups 
answered in 1988 by pleading with Moscow to restore Abkhazia's SSR status. After "Black 
Sunday" (the USSR's bloody and unsuccessful crackdown in Tbilisi) nationalist leaders 
such as Zviad Gamsakhurdia were released from prison, the popular movement gained 
momentum and Georgia declared secession from the USSR.104 Also, the movement 
became more chauvinist – according to Toft only the Communist Party now abstained 
from attacking minorities.105 In 1990 Gamsakhurdia's party came to power in Georgia106 
and Vladislav Ardzinba of the Abkhazian People's Front Aidyglara became chairman of the 
ASSRA Parl (Parliament). Despite rising tensions that already had caused bloodshed,107 a 
power sharing agreement was reached on in 1991: 43% of the seats in the ASSRA Parl for 
the Abkhaz 18% of the population, 40% for the AK 46% and 17% for the remaining 
36% ― with a 66,6% majority needed to pass certain laws.108 This agreement faced severe 
problems due to AK discontent. Later that year, 98% voted for Georgian secession from 
the USSR (of a 91% turnout) and Gamsakhurdia was elected President with 87% of the 
vote.109 Meanwhile in the AASSR, 98% of a 50% turnout voted to stay within a reformed 
USSR.110  
By the end of the year, an increasingly authoritarian Gamsakhurdia had been 
thrown from power in a coup d’état helped by great popular discontent in Tbilisi. A junta 
made up by paramilitary leaders Tengiz Kitovani and Jaba Ioseliani of "the National 
Guard" and "the Knights" respectively, plus ex-Prime Minister (PM) Tengiz Sigua who 
now accused his old boss of being hired by the Russians to destabilize Georgia and 
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"letting Islam consolidate itself in the North Caucasus."111 They called on Shevardnadze 
to lead and represent them.112 A government was formed that included the 
abovementioned triumvirate, and presidential elections were with Shevardnadze running 
as the only candidate and winning with 96%. These new authorities did not accept the 
power sharing deal.113 Later that year, the RG reverted to its 1921 constitution and the 
Abkhaz leaders claimed that by default Abkhazia was now only "united with Georgia on 
the basis of a special treaty", and governed by its 1925 Constitution.114 Aidyglara's 
Chairman underlined that this did not mean secession, but becoming a federal republic 
within Georgia. Tbilisi did not accept the proclamation, stating that it lacked a quorum.115 
War broke out later in 1992, when the National Guard entered Abkhazia to capture 
"Zviadists" ― Mingrelians who had rebelled after the ouster of their kinsman 
Gamsakhurdia. Soon, however, they headed for Sokhumi, sacked it brutally116 and moved 
on to take most of Abkhazia. Famously, a National Guard spokesman told the Abkhaz 
through TV that they should surrender or face extinction.117 The secessionist leaders fled 
to the Russian air base in Gudauta but soon came back with Russian weaponry and aid. 
When the war ended most of Abkhazia had fallen under secessionist control, excluding 
only the Upper Kodori region which was held by Emzar Kvitsiani's paramilitary group 
"the Hunters". Negotiations resulted in the stationing of (mainly RF) CIS PKs118 in a 
"security zone" (SZ) around the Inguri river separating Abkhazia from Samegrelo. A 
modest UN contribution, the UNOMIG,119 was set to oversee the peacekeeping.  The 
1994 Moscow Accords spoke of "joint action" between Tbilisi and Abkhazia on a range of 
fields, but as Coppieters points out the practical distribution of powers was left open to 
the parties.120 It was also agreed that Abkhazia should have its own Constitution, 
legislation and "appropriate state symbols."121 The RA’s Constitution, made in the 
absence of the IDPs (see below) declared Abkhazia "a sovereign, democratic, legally 
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based state",122 but in 1995 the RG adopted a Constitution that included no specifics 
regarding territorial autonomy, but explicitly referred to ASSRA as part of the country, 
thereby not recognizing the RA’s existence at all.123 
Most of the AKs, i.e. 50% of Abkhazia's population, had fled to the de facto RG 
after ethnic cleansing campaigns,124 and the RA quickly announced that the Abkhaz 
would "not tolerate becoming a minority again in their own country,"125 in effect 
committing to not letting all the IDPs (internally displaced persons) return despite their 
having committed to this in the Moscow Accords.126 The Accords carried caveats, 
however: No right of return for confirmed war criminals and people participating in 
"armed formations, preparing to fight in Abkhazia," and "security and living conditions in 
the areas of return" should be guaranteed on beforehand.127 This gave RA an opportunity 
to institutionalise a "slow return" policy, allowing 200 each year to enter and register as 
RA citizens.128 They also prevented the re-entry of AKs who they suspected "intended to 
take up arms in the future" or had sent money out of Abkhazia.129 Even so, tens of 
thousands returned spontaneously to the Gali district – which was specified in the 
Accords as the area to start "the repatriation operation". The RA refusal to start working 
towards fulfilment of these Accord commitments, served to keep RGint high. 
 
RAdU- The desired utility of the Republic of Abkhazia and the Abkhaz nationalist movement. 
At first, the most prominent dU of the Abkhaz nationalists seems to have been remaining 
within the USSR contra the Kartvelian nationalists' desire to break with it. But other and 
more basic interests were at odds. Since the initial requests to become an SSR the 
secessionists/RA authorities have taken many different positions. Some of them are 
clearly Moscow-oriented, such as f. ex. the 2001 proclamation that that they wanted 
"associate status" with the RF – including common defence, foreign and economic policy 
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plus shared currency, customs and border guarding.130 The other and more consistent 
position is that of demanding sovereignty (though possibly accepting  confederation with 
the RG). Already one month before reverting to the 1925 constitution, the newspaper 
Abkhazia printed Taras Shamba’s "treaty principles" that suggested an arrangement with 
nominal respect for Georgia’s territorial integrity, but autonomy up to and including a 
separate foreign policy.131 In 1999 the sovereignty position was confirmed by a 
referendum that endorsed the Constitution, thus making it "unconstitutional" to agree on 
anything short of symmetrical confederation or federation.132 Also, a third option once 
existed: Becoming part of "a sovereign federation of the mountain peoples within the 
USSR," such as Sergey Shamba originally wanted.133 Inspired by events occurring last 
time a Russian empire fell, the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus (CPMC) 
was founded in 1991134 in Sokhumi135 by Circassians, Vainakhs,136 Dagestanis and 
Abkhaz. Several volunteers from these nations – and Cossacks – came to the Abkhazian 
cause, but the CPMC eventually seized to be as Abkhazia got de facto sovereignty and 
war engulfed Chechnya. As regards the IDPs, the RA has displayed a total lack of interest 
in repatriation to other areas than Gali district. Statements about the "impossibility" of 
full return have often been made, and more than ten years on RA-sanctioned return is 
limited to the Gali region ― where the RA has limited control anyway, and which is seen 
by many Abkhaz as "historically Georgian".137 Clearly, the non-return of the AK majority 
is a key desire.   
                                                
 I attribute much importance to the fact that the Abkhaz nationalist movement 
really gained momentum when nationalism engulfed the Kartvelians. Historical 
discourses caused fears to arise among the Abkhaz: What would happen if the political 
and cultural dominance that Moscow had ensured for the last ten years was lost – a new 
Mahadzhirstvo or Beriyevshchina? While it would be naïve to totally exclude elements of 
cynical self-interest on the behalf of the secessionist elites ― and even active cooperation 
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137 V. Ardzinba quoted in Lynch, Dov: The Conflict in Abkhazia. Dilemmas in Russian "Peacekeeping" Policy  (The Royal 
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with the KGB – they would not have been able to organize a secessionist movement 
without historically founded popular fears, and certain Kartvelian actions that caused 
them to increase. I also find it overly instrumentalist to not believe that slogans such as 
"Georgia for the Georgians"138 and a discourses on non-Kartvelians and Kartvelians as 
"guests and hosts" respectively did not cause genuine fears among the Abkhaz elite as 
well. The fact that the Abkhaz secession bid came after the Kartvelian "anti-
discrimination" campaign started; their initial acceptance of the power-sharing 
agreement; repeated commitments to not become a minority again; and actions aimed 
towards hindering full IDP return lead me to see the core desire of the Abkhaz as 
Abkhaz (cultural) survival, which is seen as only possible through Abkhaz control over Abkhazia. 
These two interests will here be defined as the basic desired utility of Abkhazia (RAdU). 
In my view demands such as an own foreign policy are just means toward an end: The 
RA's experience from the 1992-94 war is that they need to involve a third party to have 
security from the RG, and in order to legitimately do this in the future they must be 
sovereign. RG enforcement of IDP repatriation, with subsequent removal of Abkhaz 
political dominance in Abkhazia, must be prevented. This definition of RAdU is also 
promoted by Nodia and Kaufman: In Nodia’s words "the national project of the Abkhaz 
was less about political independence than about survival as a distinct ethnic group", 
trying to avoid the "Ubykh scenario."139 One should also recall the words of Gvindzhiya 
and Kvarcheliya above, and finally in a 2008 Q&A on Lenta the current RA Pres Sergey 
Bagapsh explicitly confirmed that this is indeed the nature of RAdU:  
"People often ask me: "Why are you leading such a hard battle for independence?" This is the one most 
important reason: We want to be independent, in order to preserve ourselves as a nation, as an ethnos, 
as a people. Nothing else. (...) We don't have to hide from anyone that the Abkhaz fight for 
independence for one reason – to preserve our ethnos and to freely decide our fate. All the ethnic 
groups who live in the republic understood us. They shared our bitter lot and support our project. Only 
the Georgians did not understand us. That's how it happened, and now it's very hard to change 
anything." 140 
 
RGdU- The desired utility of Georgia 
The new elite of Georgia's desire was openly articulated from the start: To found an 
independent Kartvelian homeland141 on the territory of the GSSR. This campaign was 
made erratic by the ow level of "stateness" characteristic of a country attempting to make 
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the transition from authoritarianism to democracy ― politicians turned to the core nation 
for support and thus alienated minorities, and the apparatus was not always willing to 
obey the centre. Hence, the National Guard wrecked havoc and vindicated all Abkhaz 
fears for own survival. Tbilisi accepted the National Guard’s violent incorporation of 
Abkhazia seemingly after the fact, but were subsequently entrenched in warfare when the 
resistance came back with Russian weaponry and aid. There are, in my opinion, four main 
reasons that the RG refuses to accept the uti possidetis: (i) Historical discourses frame 
Abkhazia as an important and integral part of Georgia. (ii) While all nations are 
constructed, and may thus be deconstructed, the Georgian nation is perhaps particularly 
"deconstructable" as it consists of territorialized subethnoses. 
Fig.4: Minorities and subethnoses in Georgia 
As shown in Fig. 4, the 
provinces where Kartuli-
speaking non-Moslems 
are in majority, is just a 
thin strip of land. Hence, 
the RG's campaign to 
claim142 Abkhazia may 
be identified as a struggle 
for the nation's survival 
in much the same way as 
the RA fears the "Ubykh 
scenario" if they do not 
control RAdU: If Abkhazia falls, the whole idea of "Georgisa" may subsequently collapse 
under pressure from competing nationalisms. (iii) There is also a widespread view that 
Abkhazia is withheld from the rightful rule of Tbilisi by the Russians ― "the red-brown 
army of imperial revenge (..) waging a war with Georgia."143 While having some virtue to 
it, the Imperial conspiracy approach risks upholding a Mulholland Drive-type state of 
denial: It keeps alive the erroneous idea that there never really were ethnic conflicts, but 
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that all of Georgia's tragedies have their roots in the malicious activities of a third force. 
Coppieters comes to the same conclusion regarding Kartvelian discourse on South 
Ossetia:144 
The de facto statehood of South Ossetia is depicted as an instrument of economic privilege and the 
imperial interests of Russia. This discourse aims to delegitimise the enemy. It further reinforces the 
historical myth that identity conflicts never took place in Georgia, and that the Georgian majority 
nation has coexisted harmoniously with its minorities for centuries.145 
Darchiashvili agrees with this, when he criticises his own side of the conflict for overly 
focusing on "winning the hearts and minds of either Moscow or, sometimes, 
Washington" while "neglecting the Abkhazians themselves." 146 (iv) The RG strongly 
desire the fulfilment of the AK IDP's right to return – this demand is constantly 
articulated both in negotiations and rhetoric. Apart from socio-economic and legal issues, 
their presence is a constant reminder of lacking de facto territorial integrity, Furthermore, 
a reinstated AK majority in Abkhazia would be a forceful security net against future 
Abkhaz separatism. These interests all come down to one desire in the end: To build a 
sovereign state with territorial integrity on the territory of the former GSSR. This will be defined as 
RGdU. 
 
The Clash of Interests: How malign is the situation? 
The relationship between RAdU and RGdU is not necessarily one of objective opposition: 
Through constitutionalized (and/or otherwise guaranteed) power sharing mechanisms 
and federal republic status the Abkhaz may have a comfortable dominance over their 
homeland and control over their culture's future. Despite the lacking inclusion of 
autonomy in the RG Constitution, Shevardnadze several times argued for "a federated 
state for Abkhazia within an asymmetric Georgian federation,"147 and the Boden Plan 
presented in 2002 by the Group of Friends of the Secretary General (GF)148 ― proposing 
that Abkhazia should be more or less equal with the RG in a Tbilisi-based federated 
Georgia and the Federation should serve as the sovereign entity ― was accepted by the 
Kartvelian side. But the document contained no proposals for Abkhaz ethnic 
dominance/influence, and Tbilisi never budged on the IDP issue – thus leaving the 
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fulfilment of RAdU in the blue. Moreover, even if power sharing mechanisms were 
promised by Tbilisi, the RA may still fear that the RG would betray them the moment the 
AK majority is reinstated – particularly if not somebody the Abkhaz trust are there to 
guarantee compliance.  
 
 
4.Demography 
The demographic situation is key when it comes to measuring RABATNA, as the RA’s 
potential for unilaterally controlling RAdU gets stronger the higher the Abkhaz percentage 
of the population is. But demographic data on Abkhazia is so uncertain and so politicised 
that it makes the task of addressing RAD very difficult. The 2003 census claimed Abkhazia 
to have a population of 215.972,149 while according to NGO activist Diana Kerselyan the 
2004 Presidential polls operated with 214.000 voters and a total population of 270.000.150 
The RA MFA, however, gives us the figure 340.000.151 But RA statistics are disputed by 
many: In 1998 the UNDP measured the population to be 180-220.000,152 while a 2002 
estimate suggested 170-180.000,153 and in 2006 the International Crisis Group (ICG) 
claimed there were 157 – 190.000 inhabitants.154  
There is also much disagreement and confusion about the ethnic makeup of 
Abkhazia. The2003 RA census claimed that the Abkhaz were the largest group with 44%, 
AKs were 21%, Abkhazian Armenians (AAs) 21%, Russians 11% and 3% "others."155 
Later, however, RA Pres Bagapsh has contradicted this: In 2005 he stated there were ca. 
70.000 Abkhaz in the RA,156 while in 2008 he claimed the Abkhaz to be a 60% 
majority.157 In any case, Svendsen noted in 2005 that the Abkhaz share of the population 
is decreasing.158 RA attempts at "repatriating" Turkish Abkhaz have not had much 
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success. Bagapsh admits that "it's not happening rapidly, as we would want,"159 but has 
recently declared it a priority to make more of them move to the RA.160 However, it 
would demand much enthusiasm to leave your quite stable country of birth for an 
ancestral homeland whose future is very uncertain.  
In any case, Abkhazia has four major ethnic groups: The Abkhaz dominate the 
West, the Armenians are settled in enclaves161 and the AGs are concentrated in peripheral 
regions such as Upper Kodori and the Gali district. The Russians are spread evenly 
throughout the urban areas,162 and I do not find that their group's presence has much 
effect compared to that of the AAs and AKs. The exact number of AKs living in 
Abkhazia is also disputed, but there are probably ca. 60.000 in Gali district.163 It should be 
mentioned, however, that Sokhumi also has a sizeable AK population: Some years after 
the war, 10.000 were still left164. Incidentally, it is not uncommon to be of mixed heritage 
– though it is common to self-define as either Abkhaz or "Georgian". The AKs constitute 
a potential hostage population of the RA against the RG, and the RA has demonstrated 
that they are indeed willing and able to drive them across the "border" in case of violent 
clashes with RG agents. Since the RG gained control over the Svan area in 2006, virtually 
all Kartvelians on RA-controlled areas are Mingrelians. Whether or not they self-identify 
as "Georgians" is unclear. Todia's comments on the issue, and the name of her 
organization, points to an identity that has more to do with Samegrelo and Abkhazia than 
with Tbilisi: 
The nation of "Mingrelians" is nowhere noted, so we call ourselves Georgians. (...). Samegrelo is the 
Mingrelian region, where the Mingrelians live. Samurzakano was [pauses, thinks] Well, Gali was in 
Abkhazia, but this is an old story.  Zugdidi and Gali together make up the Mingrelian region of 
Samurzakano. Around Inguri, that is Samurzakano.165 
However, according to the 2003 RA census only 1.7% of Abkhazia’s population 
registered as Mingrelians rather than "Georgians".Regarding the AAs, the great question is 
whether or not they actually constitute the RA majority. Already in 2002 Anna Matveeva 
claimed that they did,166 and in 2006 an RG Ministry of Defence (MD) analyst told the 
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ICG that there are about 40.000 Abkhaz and 70.000 Armenians in Abkhazia.167 I met 
several people in Abkhazia who suspected the AAs were now the majority, or at least that 
the AAs, AKs and Abkhaz were equally numerous.168 Kerselyan, on the other hand, 
claimed in a 2007 interview with the blog Yandunts that Abkhazia was home to 80.000 
AAs and 100.000 Abkhaz.169  
According to RG statistics Georiga has a population of 4,394,000170 of which 
Abkhazia would constitute 4-5%.171 Accepting the 2003 RA census' figures and holding 
constant the number of Abkhaz living in the de facto RG according to the 2002 RG 
census, the Abkhaz only constitute 2.2% of Georgia's total population.172 As for 
Kartvelians, RG statistics do not divide them into subgroups. They simply state that as of 
2002 "Georgians" constitute 83,8%.173 This makes it impossible to know the exact size of 
such major minorities as the Mingrelians, Svans and Ajars, but their "heartlands" have 
populations of 480.600 (11%) and 378.800 (8,6%) respectively.174 While these data are not 
exact,175 they illustrate the advantage the Mingrelians have over the Abkhaz. 
 The presence of IDPs from Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the de facto RG 
creates a constant pressure on RG authorities. The NRC operates with 263.000 IDPs (6% 
of the total population) of which 240,000 are from Abkhazia,176 but in 2004 the RG M of 
Refugees and Accommodation and the UNHCR adjusted the figure to 221.597177 – of 
which 209,013 where AKs.178 The IDPs constitute a problem for RGE, and have a direct 
effect on RGS through IDP pressure groups as well as through their situation's effect on 
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domestic discourses on the Abkhazian Conflict. Also, the RA refusal to let them return 
affects RAR negatively.  
Summing it up, while the Abkhaz demographic situation is not very enviable they 
still constitute a larger portion of the population than prior to the war: RAD has been 
improved from 18% against 46% AKs , to 21-44% in a region where they are either the 
major nation, or no other group dominates as much as the AKs did. The demographic 
potential for controlling RAdU is better than before the war, which makes for a good 
RABATNA since any NA (or other scenario) where IDPs are allowed full/extensive return 
would would make the Abkhaz grossly outnumbered by MingreliansUnder a one-state 
solution the Abkhaz would have little power to resist if Tbilisi decided to revoke 
Abkhazian autonomy or change/discard agreements empowering the Abkhaz. Such a 
scenario is not even unlikely: If the returning IDPs were to protest guaranteed Abkhaz 
political dominance, chances are that Tbilisi would prioritize not aggravating the 
Mingrelians – who are much more numerous, and also have proved capable of rebelling 
against Tbilisi in the past. Even under a two-state solution, full/extensive return of IDPs 
would result in two Kartvelian-dominated states where the majority could demand unification 
with the RG. The Abkhazian conflict is characterized by a profound demographic 
weakness on the Abkhaz' side that raises RAint; while the RG's demographic complexity 
plus the IDP presence raise RGint. RABATNA is raised by the probable RAD-loss that would 
result from NA, while RGBATNA is lowered by the AKs in two ways: The IDP presence 
makes non-NA less bearable, while the potential "hostages" in Abkhazia makes military 
intervention a less viable alternative to NA.  
 
Fig. 5: The demographic position of Abkhazia and the Abkhaz in Georgia 
 
 
 
 
11 %
9 %
75 %
5 %Ming./Svan
core areas**
Ajara**
Rest of
Georgia
Abkhazia***
83 %
7 %
6 %
2 %
2 %
Kartvelians
Armenians
Azeri
Abkhaz*
Others
* = Maximum estimate 
based on the RA 2003 
census plus 2002 
Georgian census.  
** = Figures from Stat. 
Yearbook of Georgia 
2007. Ming./Svan core 
areas are Samegrelo-
Zemo Svaneti, Upper 
Kodori and Lentekhi. 
*** =  
Maximum estimate 
based on RA 2003 
census.  
No asterisks = Figures 
from the 2002 
Georgian census. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 39
 
 
 
 
 Fig.6: Developments in Abkhazian demography – two versions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
    
       
 
 
 
5. Economy 
5.1. The Republic of Abkhazia: A protectorate under reconstruction.  
When comparing Abkhazia before the war to the one immediately after, a bleak picture 
emerges. The war turned a major holiday resort and supplier of citrus fruit, tea and 
tobacco for the USSR/COMECON market179 into an area with a deeply damaged 
infrastructure180 ― among other things the railway link between Tbilisi and Moscow, 
running through Abkhazia, was discontinued. The majority of the population had fallen 
victim to war and ethnic cleansing,181 the GDP was 14% of the pre-war level and exports 
reduced to 19%.182 Gas was more or less absent183 and the only source of electricity was a 
hydro-electric plant located in the SZ.184 The general economic situation was described as 
"desperate" in a 1996 Open Society Institute rapport.185 Two years earlier, the RF had 
imposed a land- and sea-blockade, disconnected phone lines, refused to accept Soviet 
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passports with Abkhazian resident status and shut the border for all trade. A CIS 
economic and arms embargo followed in 1996.186 In practice, though, the CIS boycott 
was increasingly broken by RF-based actors. According to Gachelichadze the RF coastal 
blockade was "more symbolic than real", economic contact with Turkey was 
"uninterrupted"187 and the embargo never affected basic supplies such as medicine.188 
From 1997 the RF allowed a little import from Abkhazia,189 and in 1999 the border was 
reopened. The RF now started facilitating trade and travel.190 Still, Abkhazia at the outset 
of the period was marked by stark poverty. Doctors Without Borders (MSF) registered 10% 
of the population as indigent in 2002, 70% of whom lived under "unacceptable 
conditions." 191 
 The RA Gov. began to depart from the centralized economic system of Ardzinba 
in 2005, and the economy is presently seen as "neither capitalism nor socialism"192 and 
"only just in the beginning of the tunnel called ‘transitional economy’."193  The ideological 
goal is not lasseiz faire capitalism, but rather an economy with "active support" from and 
close involvement with the state. RA Deputy PM Alekasandr Stranichkin notes that 
"modern Western theories" will not necessarily fit Abkhazia and cites post-war Germany 
and contemporary China as models. Not everyone are satisfied, however – NGO activist 
Tamaz Ketsba criticises the tax system, and also complains that credits are expensive and 
very short term.194 The high micro crediting activity in the RA does indicate a shortage of 
loan availability – both WorldVision195 and the Danish Refugee Council are active in at least 
Sokhumi and G. City. Economy professor Beslan Baratelia at the Abkhazian State 
University says that annual growth is at 12%,196 and the state budget has indeed rocketed: 
At 44 mill. Russian roubles (RR) 197 in 2004, they had reached 1,6 billion RR in 2008.198 
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 Regarding infrastructure, the case of the defunct Tbilisi-Moscow railway is perhaps 
the most well known problem. One should first of all note that from Soviet times, most 
RA export and tourist industry has been north-oriented,199 so the RA’s interest in a deal 
opening the railway to Tbilisi is limited. In fact, it is rather the RG that is dependent on 
the RA and RF, as they are interested in reaching Russia and Europe while the RA is 
primarily interested in reaching Russia. The èlektrichka between Sokhumi and Sochi was 
opened already in 2002 against RG protests200 (the RF claimed a private company had 
started this traffic without their involvement).201 In 2004 a line between Sokhumi and 
Moscow was opened, once again under RG protests since there was already an agreement 
in place from 2003 linking the opening of the line to AG IDPs returns.202 Upon my field 
work in Sokhumi November 2007, the railway was functioning. However, while links 
from Sokhumi to Russia flourish, internal RA railways are dying out: The èlektrichka to 
Gudauta, f.ex. was closed at the end of 2007.203 From that perspective it would be 
favourable if a line to Georgia was opened, since it would boost East Abkhazia's 
infrastructure. Svendsen also points out it would be even more economically beneficial 
for the RA to host a general Caucasian-Russian railway link than just an RA-RF link.204 
The RA's reemergence as a tourist hot spot has led to projected rehabilitation of the road 
between Psou and Gagra,205 but it must be said that this is a drop in the ocean: Roads are 
in a state that some places make it quite impossible for people to transport agricultural 
products to the cities.206 Regarding communication infrastructure, the RA is dependent 
on Russia: Both mobile networks and internet connections are provided by the RF. 
Internet access has exploded since 2004, and upon my arrival in Sokhumi I found several 
internet cafés with Russian standards were up and running. For those who can afford it, 
an ICT-revolution has taken place in Abkhazia. Developing the RA's infrastructure also 
benefits Russian tourists, who are the fuel of the RA's most "booming" economic sphere. 
The RA Min of Economy (MinE) claimed tourism had increased with 40% annually since 
2004, and that in 2006 around 1.5 – 2 mill visitors came.207 AmCham News say that while 
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they are sceptical to the figures, "even cut in half" they mean that equally many or more 
tourists visit Abkhazia as the rest of de jure RG.208 The 2007 influx was in fact more than 
the country could handle: According to people who were present, shortages ensued and 
the hotel capacity was inadequate (which on the positive side gave local people an 
opportunity to rent out rooms).209 But recently Russians have had a particular interest in 
buying delapitated buildings (of which Abkhazia has many) and rebuilding them as 
hotels.210 The upcoming Sochi Olympics could also result in the rehabilitation of the RA's 
airport.211 
 The strengthening of economic ties to the RF were both on a micro and macro 
level – from a joint confectionary manufacturing venture to a general agreement on 
economic cooperation between the RA and Moscow.212 The RA is so set on economic 
integration with the RF that the RA Parl. even sends delegations to the South Russian 
Parliaments’ Association (SRPA).213 The ties with the RF have also manifested in a certain 
inclusion of the RA in the Sochi 2014 Olympic infrastructure. The RA's economic 
integration into the RF was further developed after  the Republic of Kosovo's (RK) 
declaration of independence, following which the RF formally revoked all sanctions, 
opened up for tax-free trade214 and advised the RF Gov to increase economic 
cooperation.215 In April 2008, Putin also said that the RF should recognize RA-based 
commercial companies and other organizations. 216 
Gvindzhiya's words sum up the situation seen from the RA’s perspective: "In each 
status quo there is internal dynamics, and the present one makes it possible for us to 
develop economically,"217 "we slowly get rich because of stability."218 Even Ketsba, who 
is fairly critical of the economic policy, says that "every year the economy is better, and 
our authorities have big plans."219 There are two catches to the present internal dynamics, 
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however: (i) Despite all progress the RA is still plagued by poverty and crime, and (ii) the 
massive economic dependency on the RF.   
As the General Director of the Sukhumi Babayevskiy Trade House complains to 
AmChamNews, the embargo gives Abkhazia "only one vector of movement"220 and 
Ketsba states that "you know how they say the Russians bought all of Montenegro? Well, 
they'll buy our entire coast too. Our politicians don't say anything about that."221 The 
dependency was illustrated quite well when from March 2006 to October 2007 the RA 
was hit by a general embargo on Georgia wines, nominally caused by health concerns.222 
It was discontinued after RA exporters passed an examination in Russia.223 But the fall 
saw more RF-related troubles: An outbreak of swine fever in East Abkhazia caused an 
embargo on all agricultural products224 in the middle of an important season for fruit 
export (particularly tangerines, the "specialty" of Abkhazia)225 that did not end until 
November 2,226 causing farmers to fear heavy losses.227 Not many days after the embargo 
ended, Abkhazia suffered a massive blackout228 and the RA state electricity company 
Chërnomorènergo's RF partner had to supply them until repairs had been made.229 
Gvindzhiya tells AmCham News that they are attempting to diversify and that European 
private investors are involved in tourism.230 Ketsba, however, has experienced that non-
Russian investors are "interested" but when push comes to shove will not invest.231 
Naturally, insecurities due to the RG claim on the RA plays a role here. Under a scenario 
where the RA is incorporated into the RG, investors will face problems – even if it 
happens without violence, houses important for business may be reclaimed by returning 
AKs.232,233 RG MinFA Gela Bezuashvili has warned that "the time will come when illegally 
purchased property will be returned to the legal owners."234 There is one other country, 
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however, whose firms engage notably in transactions with the RA: Turkey.235 In 1999 
62% of imports and 45% of RA exports went to Turkey,236 and the period under analysis 
saw the firm Tamsaş start open pit mining in Tkuarcheli. Ketsba says that "[in Tkuarcheli] 
everything was destroyed, there was no work. There was administration and bureaucracy 
[left] – and that’s it". But the excavations and shipping out from Ochamchira made "living 
a bit better" for locals.237 The RA Pres' website reports that 75% of Tkvarcheli's 2006 
budget came from Tamsaş tax payments.238 The firm also exports scrap metal239 and 
wood,240 but such transportations are often interfered with by the RG Coast Guard – 
they are, after all, illegal since Abkhazia de jure is RG territory.241 
                                                
 Regarding the first problem, Blakkisrud and Koltsø claim that the "overall picture" 
is one of "gradual improvement."242 The RA MinE claims that wages jumped 50% in 
2005,243 but Deputy PM Stranichkin admits that "the medium wage, despite a 
considerable increase, still is very low"244 and Ketsba was particularly concerned for the 
countryside where subsistence economy prevails and infrastructure problems block trade. 
He also said that the bad wages cause a high level of corruption.245 Organized crime is 
also rampant. Gali is often cited as the worst example, though in Sokhumi many brought 
up Tkuarcheli (also in East Abkhazia) as an example of the ultimate misery. Bagapsh also 
insisted in a 2008 interview with Lenta that the Gali was better off than other places in 
Abkhazia, and also parts of the de facto RG.246 It may simply be a discursive "spinal 
reflex" that the mention of AGs’ situation is countered by pointing out that the Gali is 
better off than other places – this most certainly was a reaction that came up quite often. 
Then again, the outside has definitely given the AGs status of "worthy victim" and 
forgotten about the fact that many Akbhaz and Armenians are still internally displaced 
inside Abkhazia, having had their property destroyed during the ethnic cleansing and war. 
Despite this, I will pay particular attention to Gali since I have first hand experience. 
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Infrastructure and houses there were devastated both under the war and again during the 
"May Events" of 1998 when RG paramilitaries and RA forced clashed, and the local 
population was driven out of Abkhazia again.247 There are only two medical assistance 
centres, some people live in burnt-down houses,248 the economy is mainly subsistence 
and economically productive families are hard to find, working age men to a large extent 
go to other places to earn money and in any case making a lot of money may simply mean 
that you will be robbed. A problem particular to the region is that of lacking 
"passportizatsiya" – many lack RA passports and therefore have problems dealing with 
the RA authorities. According to Bagapsh, the only passport you can hold in addition to 
the RA's is the Russian. The Gali AKs instead have Formula #9, a document that lets you 
live there, travel into de facto RG, and vote at RA elections.249 Though there is a lot of 
export to Samegrelo,250 criminal networks make sure that the profits stay on few hands. 
Also, since the tourist industry targets West Abkhazia and Sokhumi, East Abkhazia sees 
nothing of its positive effects. The current trend is causing an economic divide to rise 
between the West/Sokhumi and the East – with the old spa city of Gagra and the ruined 
refugee camp of Gali epitomizing each tendency. But as said above, neither AKs nor East 
Abkhazians monopolize suffering in the region: Consider that in 2002 MSF found twice 
as many indigent Russians as AKs, and 39% of the indigents lived in Sokhumi ― where 
AKs are a minority.251 A particularly frustrated group was the Abkhaz war veterans, 
whose unemployment rates were particularly high, leading many to subsist on pensions 
and suicide rates so high as to cause public debate.252 However, the increasing amount of 
people holding RF passports has improved the pensioners' situation, as such passport-
holders are entitled to Russian pensions in addition to RA pensions253 ― constituting a 
difference between RR 100,- and RR 1.260,- per month.254 
 Conclusively, the RA economy has seen a boom in the period of analysis that 
heightens RABATNA enormously. The RF link gives the RA economic power to resist both 
the stick and the carrot from an economically resurgent RG, and gives them more capital 
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to invest in other projects that enhance their control over RAdU (f.ex. military power). 
However if the East/West divide solidifies, this may lower social cohesion in the East. In 
general, the socio-economic situation is far from adequate. Also, one should problematize 
the extent to which the involvement with Russia is actually beneficial for controlling 
RAdU. While this kind of dependency does not actually disqualify from being a state – e.g. 
Bhutan receives ca. 3/5 of its budget expenditures from India255 ― but the ethnic Abkhaz 
control over Abkhazia (RAdU) is being reduced by the increasing prominence of RF 
actors. More importantly: Should the RF abandon the RA, the current structure of RAE 
becomes a major problem for them.  
  
5.2. Georgia: Growing stronger and jerking the Russian chain 
Before the Rose Revolution, the RG was not a country that seemed economically 
tempting to become part of. There had been a power shortage already before the 
1990s,256 and after the civil wars this sector was devastated: In 1995 only 28,7% of the 
power plants were in working order and an energy crisis peaked.257 The gas infrastructure 
was in shambles, and in 1995-96 only two cities had gas supplies at all, not including 
Tbilisi.258  The situation was not much better in the sectors of oil, coal and alternative 
energy sources. In 2001 54% of the population lived below the poverty line and the year 
before Georgia received $150 mill. in economic aid.259 The status of RGE was a major 
cause of popular dissatisfaction, and thus also the Rose Revolution. 
 Saakashvili set out to reduce corruption and make the RG a better country to 
invest in. He argued the need to give "vast powers to a new elite, small, honest 
investigative unit that would really tackle high-level corruption" and that "every corrupt 
official (...) betrays the national interest." He also declared corruption to be un-Georgian: 
Bribe-taking is not a Georgian tradition. Feudalism was Georgia’s greatest enemy, but David the 
Builder [the Georgian king who united Georgia in the twelfth century] eradicated [it]. Neither 
corruption nor enmity is part of Georgian tradition. External forces are establishing such a way of life 
in our country, which is based on the principle of divide and rule.260 
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He followed up with arrests of high-profile businessmen, law enforcement officials and 
bureaucrats.261 Salaries were raised, and reforms were made in the police and education 
sectors.262 Transparency International noted a clear decrease in corruption following the 
Revolution,263 but ICG quotes sources saying that corruption is still rampant in the higher 
echelons ― though now absent from "the streets."264  Large scale privatization was also 
on the agenda, evident from MinE Kakha Bendukidze Liberalist credo "everything can be 
sold, except conscience."265 But the ICG claims many privatizations have been "patently 
non-transparent."266 There is indeed a touch of "Wild East" in many RG economic 
dealings, with the state allegedly intimidating owners into selling their property cheaply 
and demanding "voluntary" gifts from the business community.267 Still, in the period the 
the RG rose steadily on the World Bank's Doing Business Report from Nr. 112 in 2005268 to 
Nr. 18 in 2008.269 
 A particular problem the RG faced following the Rose Revolution was economic 
sanctions from its most important trading partner Russia,270 due to increasing resistance 
to RFdU. It began with restrictions on agricultural exports in December 2005 and was 
followed by a general boycott of RG wine, harassment and forcible expulsion of 
Georgians living in Russia, increases in oil- and gas prices271 and the closing of all land-, 
sea- and air-communication between the countries in 2006.272 Estimates showed that 
1/5273 of Georgian citizens (or even as many as 500.000)274  worked in Russia, sending 
remittances home. In the event, though, this had little effect on remittances according to 
economists at Tblisi State University (TSU). Regarding the wine boycott, 87% of the RG's 
wine production was sent to Russia.275 While some Georgians voiced the opinion that 
getting around the sanctions would not be all that hard,276 TSU economists maintain that 
this sector of the economy did indeed notice the boycott: Wine, bottled mineral water and 
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agricultural product exports "declined sharply."277 The RG lost $175.000 in exports to 
Russia,278 and suffered a total loss of around $600.000279 Furthermore, inflation – that 
had been around 5% since 2000 – has been moving up and down around the 10% mark 
since 2005,280 and the embargoes have caused price increases.281 However, despite the 
boycott, general economic growth was 8,5%-9%282 in 2006 and 12,5% in the first six 
months of 2007 alone.283 The RG dealt with the RF sanctions by threatening to block 
their accession into the WTO284 and pursuing alternatives: For example, to replace the RF 
postal route (80% of mail sent from the RG passed through the RF) they closed a deal 
with Ukraine;285 and when explosions in RFR North Ossetia damaged the main transport 
infrastructure for oil, gas and electricity from the RF to the RG in the winter 2005/2006, 
they got emergency supplies from Azerbaijan and Iran. Saakashvili stated that this would 
be the last winter the RF could launch an "energy offensive" due to the creation of the 
Baku-Tblisi-Erzurum pipeline,286 and that the RG would seek energy independence.287 
Though the RG Gov celebrated the "energy diversification" as a success,288 companies 
associated with the RF state structures have continued to eat their way into the RG energy 
market.289 A similar strategy of making Russia less relevant was taken regarding the 
railway through Abkhazia: In November 2007 Tbilisi signed an agreement with Turkey 
and Azerbaijan on building the Baku-Akhalkalaki-Kars railroad that will constitute a new 
transportation route between Asia and Europe, bypassing Russia ― something Saakashvili 
called a "geo-political revolution." Kazakhstan has already pledged to use this new "Silk 
road" for cargo transport.290 It should be noted of course that this does not address the 
problem of transporting goods to the RF, nor mend the RG's lacking infrastructure 
connection with Abkhazia. Rather, it solidifies the RG's and RA's economical 
disintegration from each other. 
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 RGE's growth, though impressive, is not without caveats: The ICG reports that 
official economic data are exaggerated, and that inflation is "significantly higher" than the 
reported annual 9%. Lacking job opportunities also pose a severe problem, and the RG 
PM has admitted that 25% of the population still live below the poverty line.291 There 
have been certain economic improvements for common people: F.ex. by 2007 electricity 
was available 24 hours a day in Tbilisi and most of the day in the rural areas, and there 
had been great infrastructure repairs.292 But expectations have clearly not been fulfilled. 
The state pensions may provide an example of the general situation: According to the 
ICG pensions are now 300% up from the Shevardnadze era but $30 is still "too low to 
survive on."293 Also, for people with IDP status the economic situation has not improved. 
According to the NRC 43-45% of them live in "collective centres in sub-standard living 
conditions" and the rest are not too well off either.294 
 Conclusively, RGE has boomed, and that potential has been translated, as we shall 
see below, on a grand scale into military power. They are attempting to become less 
dependent on the RA's "sponsor" Russia, which would also serve to raise their control 
over RGdU since independence from Russia is part of that, but the RF is still so influential 
in particularly the energy sector that some fear they are "entrapping" the RG in a "liberal 
empire".295 The strong economic links to the RF can be a problem in scenario of open 
conflict with the RA without prior agreement with the RF. Still, the RG has attracted 
investors from "the West" and integrated more with its southern neighbours. But despite 
all this, the RGE situation is still so undesirable for the general population that it affects 
RGS negatively – particularly in the light of Saakashvili's initial promises.  
 
 
6. Military capabilities 
6.1.The RA's military power: Borrowed superiority. 
The RA’s de facto statehood was not won by unilateral military power, three RF-related 
factors were vital: (i) Access to weaponry from the local RF military base in Gudauta, (ii) 
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an RF-based volunteer movement, and (iii) RF forces obstructing pro-RG forces.296  
According to Pavel Baev, the 1992 National Guard offensive could have taken Abkhazia 
in "days if not hours"297 if it had not been for these RF-related factors. Nodia, however, 
claims that RF involvement alone would not have been enough, since the Abkhaz’ fears 
for their nation’s survival created a "drive"298 that was decisive. The RG could have been 
"quagmired" by guerrilla resistance, had not RF factors prevented their holding  
Abkhazia.299 
According to current RA Minister of Defence (MinD) Mirab Kishmariya the RA 
military forces were founded on the basis of the 8th regiment of the USSR M. of the 
Interior (MI), that came under ASSRA’s command in 1991. A year later the State Defence 
Committee, the RA MD and the General Staff was founded.300 Exact data about on RA 
military capabilities are hard to come by – the secessionists themselves are not very 
helpful, having classified the number of troops as "a secret."301 There have, though, been 
attempts at measuring their military power. In their 2008 overview over the RG and RA 
forces, Lenta were unsure about the exact current numbers of aircrafts but their 
speculations lend little hope to the RA ("a few", "a couple", "possibly not usable 
anymore") and they do not mention the navy at all302 – though In 2001 David Darchiashvili 
claimed the RA navy consisted of 2 patrol boats, 9 fishing vessels [sic], 1 motorboat, 8 
civil boats, 2 Howitzers and 1 BRDM-2.303 Darchiashvili estimated the personnel to 
count 3,000 heads plus 45,000 reservists while the RF journal Nezavisimoye Voyennoye 
Obozrenie estimated 5,000 personnel and 50,000 reservists.304 In 2008 Lenta estimated 
4,500 personnel and a maximum wartime capacity of 15-16,000 people.305 The amount of 
people who would show up to resist the RG is dependent on RAint. During the October 
Events, the RA was able to call one of the most disgruntled groups, the war veterans, 
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despite RAS being worse then than now (see 8.1). Today RAS is better, and RAint (fears) is 
raised to a level where the reservist potential is high (see 9.) 
 The degree of RA military dependence on RF support is disputed. Gachelichadze 
attributed the existence of an RA army fully to a flow of "unofficial non-humanitarian 
aid,"306 and for educational purposes the RF still plays a large role – in 2005RA Min. D 
Sultan Sosnaliyev said senior/middle ranking officers regularly attend 2-3 month training 
courses in Russia.307 The current RA Min. D though, recently said that a domestic military 
academy was to be founded.308 In any case the RF plays a substantial role through the 
PKs and its forces in South Russia. The PKs currently number 1.500-2.000 – and though 
the RG recently claimed there to be 4.000,309 UNOMIG says that they have not registered 
build-ups on either side310 - but the RF have announced that they will boost the force to 
3.000 people due to potential RG aggression (though in fact, the Duma advised the RF 
Gov to increase numbers already on March 21 2008).311 The RA Min. D. refuses all such 
claims of CISPK partiality,312 but neither he nor Gvindzhiya makes it a secret that they do 
not wish for any other PKs. 313 
The RF has made it quite clear it will support the RA in case of an RG attack,314 
and there have been very tense moments between the CISPK and the RG. The 
"Ganumukhuri Incident" in 2007, where CISPK troops detained (and beat up, according 
to the IWPR) RG police officers inside the Ganmukhuri "patrotic youth camp" in the SZ, 
led the RG Parl. to demand the withdrawal of the CISPK and declare their commander 
Sergey Chaban persona non grata. This was not the first time the RG had demanded the 
withdrawal of the CISPK,315 but the RA insists that they should stay and316 and argue that 
only the CIS’ Council of Heads of State can decide to withdraw the CISPK.317 As for 
Chaban, the RF claimed he had a right to stay.318 
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 In a worst case scenario for the RG, they attack the RA and/or the Republic of 
South Ossetia (RSO) and end up at war with the RF – who state that they are obliged to 
protect RF citizens in the Georgian breakaway republics, which would mean most of their 
current inhabitants.319 This scenario is less disastrous for the RG now than prior to the 
Rose Revolution: Until recently the RF had still had bases in Georgia, but the last ones 
were evacuated in 2007.320 The base in Gudauta was supposed to have been left for the 
CISPK in 2001, but the RG suspects foul play.321 Tbilisi claims one of the RG drones 
shot down over Abkhazia in 2008 fell victim to an RF fighter plane from Gudauta.322 But 
in any case, the RF have formidable forces on the other side of the mountains – that may 
enter Abkhazia without crossing the mountains from Maykop via Sochi, and the Black 
Sea Fleet on the Crimea. Also, the mountains between North- and South Ossetia host the 
Roki Tunnel that gives land forces the possibility to easily reach Tskhinvali, which again is 
only 100 km from Tbilisi.323 Most importantly, however, RF airplanes can cross the 
Caucasus and reach Tbilisi in no time at all – and as Jane's point out the RG air defence is 
incapable of stopping Russian aircrafts.324 
 The increasing coordination between the RSO, the RA and the Pridenstrovian 
Moldovian Republic (PMR) also has a measure of positive effect. Already before the 
founding of their common "IGO" Community for Democracy and Peoples' Rights (CDPR) in 
2006, Bagapsh declared that the RA would support the RSO in case of war.325 The Min. 
FA confirmed in September 2007 also stated that the CDPR plans to form joint 
"peacekeeping" units that can be inserted if CISPK is removed.326 The PMR is quite 
useless in an RG-RA conflict, but the active involvement of the RSO is more valuable. 
While the RA unilaterally seems capable of little more than attacking Samegrelo-Zemo 
Svaneti,327 the RSO has Tbilisi within its reach – though they are not much of a challenge 
for the RG themselves. 
 
6.2. The RG's military power: A focal point of Saakashvili's administration. 
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After reclaiming Gamsakhurdia's stronghold in Samegrelo and made arrangements in 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the RG faced the problem of lacking control over the 
National Guard and the Knights – an obstacle to planned strategic usage of military 
means, and in itself a factor weakening control over RGdU. During the 1990s, Kitovani 
and Ioseliani were arrested, the Knights dissolved and the National Guard brought under 
control. Certain paramilitary groups still operated in Georgia, though: The Forest 
Brethren and the White Legion in the Security Zone, and the Hunters in the Kodori area 
– the two first sometimes aided by RG security services in their onslaughts into 
Abkhazia.328 In 1998 such an attack started the May Events,329 and in 2001 paramilitaries 
mined areas in East Abkhazia.330 The October Events the same year, though, only 
demonstrated once more the RG's lack of power against an RF- supported RA. But 
Tbilisi's quest for "Western" military aid331 and NATO involvement had rapidly gave 
results: The US stopped its arms embargo that very year, and launched a program of 
"piecemeal military assistance".332 In 2002 the RG decided to seek military security 
through NATO and economic security through the EU, according to Hillingsø.333 While 
the NATO-orientation of the RG started under Shevardnadze, Saakashvili sped up the 
process. In 2004 the RG joined Partnership for Peace (PfP) and began implementing the 
Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). Intensified Dialogue began in 2006, and an 
IPAP-based Strategic Defence Review (SDR) was released in 2007. However, ISS claims 
that NATO countries were "alarmed" when the RG in 2007 decided to increase its army 
by a 2,500 strong brigade instead of reducing it to 13,000,334 and nor was the November 
2007 crackdown on the opposition (see 8.2) popular abroad. The bad RG-RF relationship 
may in itself be an obstacle: The French Min. D have said that admittance to NATO 
could only happen if Russia does not see the RG as a threat.335 Finally, the fact that the 
RG has unresolved internal conflicts in itself hinders their entry into NATO. 
 The RG's unilateral military power is much larger now than prior to the 
Revolution. While in 2001 the RG had 16,000-20,000 personnel, 250,000 reservists, 90 
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tanks, 72 artillery units, 7 planes and 3 helicopters – the corresponding numbers today are 
28,700 – 33,000 personnel, 70,000 reservists, 100 tanks, 90 artillery units, 12 planes and 40 
helicopters.336 In addition, Coppieters claims that the RG has built up a 100.000 
personnel strong force for "protecting territorial integrity",337 there are plans to merge the 
navy with the coast guard into a Joint Maritime Defence Force338, according to Lenta the 
force of reservists and volunteers will be increased to 200.000339 and Jane's say that a 5th 
brigade of 3.300 men that will specialise in "peacekeeping or stabilisation" will be 
operational from 2009 ― boosting the armed forces' numbers to 32.000.340 Parts of the 
build-up has been concentrated in the West: A new base was established in 2006 at Senaki 
and the 5th battalion is to be based in Khoni.341 While the RG only has the right to 750 
police officers inside the SZ, Izvestiya claims that "in reality on the Georgian side there are 
2.500 military servicemen armed to the teeth" and "yet 2000 men in Upper Kodori" with 
"instructors" from the US and France in the camps342 - but these data can not be 
accepted uncritically. Lacking accurate knowledge regarding forces in Upper Kodori has 
lead to many rumours. In September 2007 the RA Min. D claimed there to be 800 
uniformed people there in addition to the police forces,343 but one month later 
Gvindzhiya claimed that the gorge held 3,000 RG soldiers (while the CISPK only 
numbered 1,000) and when recent tensions began the RF and RA claimed a presence of 
1,500 RG soldiers344 but later an anonymous source from one of the RF "power 
ministries" used the figure 3,000.345 In addition, we have the paramilitaries. They were 
officially disbanded by RG Min. D Irakli Okruashvili soon after the Revolution, but after 
the Kodori Crisis (see 9.) there have been renewed paramilitary activity. Also, the RG has 
established two "patriotic youth camps" inside the SZ – one in Ganmukhuri village, the 
other near Zugdidi. Even UNOMIG seems a bit uncertain as to whether these 
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installations have a military value or not, as this statement from Gali CIMIC346 officer 
Mark Bringedal indicates: 
MiB: Then what are [the youth camps] really? 
MaB: That’s a good question. We are allowed to go in there, usually. The CIS peacekeepers are not 
allowed. So there is some kind of transparency. There are many allegations of these camps housing 
military personnel. Some may also want it to seem like military camps. But we can come and see, and 
we don’t find anything. It might have been a strategic place to put military installations, and call it 
something else. But we don’t have observations that support this.347 
In addition to all this, the RG has bought 40 drones from Israel, which are currently being 
used to monitor RA-controlled territory.348 Several of these have been shot down, and the 
latest three incidents in 2008 have contributed significantly to increased conflict intensity. 
The RG has asked NATO for help in case of armed clashes,349 while the RA said that 
they were ready to go under RF military control if this secured them from the RG.350  
Fig. 7: The RA-RG military balance.351 
 
6.3. The military imbalance  
The RG have large forces near Abkhazia and a 
potential for "squeezing" both the RA and CISPK 
by moving in from Upper Kodori (less than 30 km 
NE of Sokhumi),352 the Zugdidi area (little more 
than 100 km SE of Sokhumi)353 and the sea ― the 
invasion plan of the RG, according to the 
abovementioned anonymous RF source includes 
"capturing the most important objects on the 
coastline."  
If the RG's surveillance flights over RA-held 
territory recently has produced anything more 
than scrap metal floating around in 
the Black Sea and tense diplomatic relations, they 
may also have mapped out RA military 
                                                 
346 Civil-Military Co-operation. 
347 Author’s interview with Mark Bringedal at the Gali UNOMIG base, November 13 2007 
348 www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=17657; lenta.ru/news/2008/04/22/forty/ 
349 lenta.ru/news/2008/04/28/nato/ 
350 lenta.ru/news/2008/05/06/control/ 
351 Based on data presented earlier in this chapter. 
352Abkhazia Today (ICG 2006)*, p. 21 
353 Izvestiya 19.12.07, p. 9 
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infrastructure well enough to take out important parts of it quickly. Evidently from Fig. 
7354 the RA has little chances if alone against the RG. 
Since the RA's military control is defined by its forces relative to that of the RG, RAM is 
now even worse than prior to the Rose Revolution – despite the fact that RA resistance 
will most probably be fierce, as they will (believe themselves to) be fighting for survival. A 
factor not shown in these tables is that of equipment quality: Lenta tells of a world of 
difference between the two on that level also.355 But the RA's military control is and has 
always mostly been borrowed from the RF, and while this is a source of RAM instability it 
does not currently look like the RF is close to "ditching# the secessionists for Tbilisi. 
Since conflict intensity exploded in the early spring of 2008, the RA have proposed to 
sign an agreement of military cooperation with Russia,356 who is of course is vastly 
superior to the RG in military terms: In the period 2005 – 06 they had a total of 1,037,000 
soldiers; 22,950 tanks and 2,188 combat aircrafts.357 
Presently, the RG is perfectly able to launch a "blitzkrieg" and take Abkhazia, but 
if the RF honours its promises they face an overwhelming adversary. Sergey Markedonov 
deems the RG's trust that "the West" will come to their aid as faulty, arguing that the 
US/NATO would not want to get stuck in the Caucasus as well as Iraq and Afghanistan, 
and that the EU would not want to "help Serbia" by taking a tough stance on Georgian 
secessionism.358 This presupposes that the US/NATO do not launch operations that 
entrap them in wars; and that the EU will not find reasons to treat the Kosovo Conflict 
and the Abkhazian Conflict differently. While neither of these presuppositions are 
obviously correct, Markedonov has a good point: It is in no way given that NATO would 
support Georgia with direct military means in a conflict with the RF. 
  A more fundamental question is whether military build-ups, captures of strategic 
territories and bouts of semi-bellicose rhetoric (see 9.) are really fruitful approaches to 
secure RGdU. Tbilisi’s NATO orientation has only served to aggravate the RF further, as 
Jane's point out,359 leading to a vicious circle: The RG seeks NATO integration, which 
raises RFint against Tbilisi and causes them to sponsor the RA and RSO more and more; 
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again causing RGint to rise against all three units – who increasingly are seen as one 
Moscow-controlled whole. Thus, we get a dangerous intensity build-up that threatens to 
cause all-out war. 
 
 
7. Recognition and rights 
7.1. The Aggregate Level: Tbilisi' supreme advantage. 
In its struggle to secure RAdU, the RA has taken the path of demanding sovereign 
statehood. The fulfilment of this desire is dependent on the degree to which other states 
bestow it upon them. Though the RA does have a more stable internal political 
constitution than certain recognized states (e.g. Somalia), it has not received recognition 
from anyone. Hence, this source of power over RAdU is in principle inaccessible for the 
RA and instead is a source of RG control over RAdU.: RABATNA can never include formal 
sovereign statehood, lest other states begin to deny the RG territorial integrity within the 
GSSR's borders. At the moment of writing, the only entities relating to the RA as if it was 
a sovereign state are other CDPR states. Recently, the RSO even opened an "embassy" in 
the RA,360 but these live role-playing games of statehood do not actually give anyone legal 
recognition.  
 RGR on the other hand is principally at the 100% mark – there is no state in the 
world that does not recognize Tbilisi's legal right to RGdU. But their lacking recognition 
from the RA is in practice much more important than the recognition they receive from 
most other states: E.g. Chile's recognition does not change much for the RG’s 
situation,361 while Sokhumi’s denial of recognition does - imagine if at some point 
Sokhumi had decided that instead of categorically denying to respect RG territorial 
integrity, they would consider doing just that under certain preconditions.  
Also, the RF's formal recognition of the RG's right to control RGdU is tainted by 
Russia's actions. Already before the Rose Revolution they ignored criticism of the CISPK, 
and allegedly bombed the Pankisi gorge several times.362 After the Revolution, the RF has 
been accused of violating RG airspace and bombing RG territory on several occasions, 
and Tbilisi's desires to have the CISPK removed have been ignored. Following the RK 
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declaration of independence on February 17, this tendency got even more pronounced. 
The RA has long pinned its highest hopes on the RF’s reactions to RK secession – and 
Russia can easily be accused of contributing to these high hopes. Already in early 2006 
Putin warned that  
If some one thinks that Kosovo can be granted full independence, than [sic] why should we 
refuse this to Abkhazians, or South Ossetians?. We know, for example, that Turkey has recognized 
the Republic of North Cyprus. I do not want to say that Russia will immediately recognize Abkhazia 
or South Ossetia as independent and sovereign states, but precedents (…) already exist…363 
In late 2007 then-leader of the dominant United Russia party Boris Gryzlov stated that 
the newly elected RF Parl. Would "watch carefully how Russian citizens have cast their 
ballots in Abkhazia and South Ossetia" and debate recognition.364 On February 12 2008 
RA Min. FA Sergey Shamba said that "a former autonomy within Yugoslavia" getting 
recognized would be "a direct analogy" though the Abkhaz were more entitled to 
sovereignty than the RK since "we [Abkhaz] live in our age-old native land, we have no 
second motherland and we have had statehood throughout the centuries."365 On the day 
of the RK's secession, the RA and RSO asked the world to recognize them, and the RF 
responded with a number of beneficial initiatives. The Duma even asked the RF Gov to 
"look into the possibilities for quickening the objective process of ‘sovereignization’ 
[sic],"366 and SRPA unanimously recommended the RF Gov. to recognize them.367 
According to the New York Times RF officials said that future RF-RA relations should 
resemble those of Taiwan and the USA.368 Gvindzhiya commented that he had not 
expected formal recognition as it would "bring a diplomatic burden" on Moscow, and 
that "the political attitude is less important to us than the practical and economic."369 In 
April the RF Pres. Himself said that the RF should establish direct, formal ties with the 
Georgian statelets, recognize all companies and organizations based in them, and repeated 
that Russia would provide security for their citizens there.370 Shamba called this "de facto 
recognition",371 while the RG called it de facto annexation.372  
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In the wake of this diplomatic crisis and the ensuing military tension; NATO and 
the EU reaffirmed their support for Tbilisi.373 Coppieters claims that the RA refusal to let 
the IDPs exercise their right of return guarantees non-recognition from EU members.374 
While there are also many Serb IDPs, victims of Kosovar Albanian ethnic cleansing, a 
major difference pointed out by Thomas de Waal is that should the Serbs return there 
would still be a Kosovar Albanian majority375 and thus a majority for RK sovereignty. 
This fact punches a hole in the RA's complaints that a people’s right to self-determination 
is being sacrificed on the altar of territorial integrity: If one defines "the people" as the 
current inhabitants plus the IDPs, the majority of the people are unlikely to support 
secession. Other and less moral reasons for the differences in treatment of the RK and 
RA include the former’s strong connection to a block of states versus the RA's 
dependence on one state; Tbilisi's latter-day favourite status with NATO versus Serbia's 
anti-NATO climate; the RK's status as a general cause celebre in many "Western" countries 
(as pointed out by Coppieters)376; and the fact that Kosovo-Metohija's population is 
about five times bigger than Abkhazia's.  
                                                
 But we are now talking about the RA's right to sovereignty, while in this thesis I 
define RAdU as Abkhaz cultural survival through control over Abkhazia. Considering that 
the RA Abkhaz are formally subjects of the RG, how are their rights to RAdU within the 
RG legal framework? What seems clear is that the RG considers the Abkhaz to be 
ranked above the national minorities – who are to be integrated377 into the general 
"demos" through "institutionalized protection of their rights"378 but not given 
autonomy.379 The 2005 draft Concept on Protection of National Minorities and Integration Policy 
that predated ratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
stated that national minority members were "obliged to respect [the] Georgian and 
Abkhaz nations, their history and traditions."380 It is probably quite constructive for the 
Abkhazian Conflict that the RG considers the Abkhaz as something other than the 
national minorities, as they would never settle with rights as modest as those bestowed 
 
373 news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7350442.stm; www.civil.ge/eng/detail.php?id=17617 
374 Coppieters 2007, p. 9 
375 www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-caucasus/abkhazia_serbia_3787.jsp 
376Coppieters 2007, p. 9 
377 ecmi.de/40/2005/09/21/GEORGIA-PREPARING-FOR-RATIFICATION-OF-FRAMEWORK-CONVENTION-ON-
MINORITIES.php; 
378 Georgia's Democratic Transformation: An update since the Rose Revolution. (Government of Georgia 2007)* 
379 Kartvelian subgroups are not included as national minorities, of course. 
380 www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=10029,  
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upon such nations. But what kind of rights do the Abkhaz have? The RG Constitution 
refers to the RG as "independent, unified and indivisible" and specifies that it 
encompasses "the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia"381 which has the 
right to Senate representation.382 Abkhazia's "higher representative body" has the right to 
legislative initiative383 and to submit claims to the Constitutional Court384 Also, the RG 
Parl  
for the term of its authority (...) shall elect the President and the Vice-Presidents of the Parliament by 
a secret ballot, inter alia, one from the members of the Parliament elected respectively in Abkhazia and 
the Autonomous Republic of Ajara upon the submission of the latter385 
But in fact, none of these articles say anything about RAdU. For one thing, the entity 
made reference to is the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia (ARA) and not the RA. 
Secondly, the Constitution only talks about ARA's rights to affect decision making in 
Tblisi – not autonomy. Finally, nothing is said about the rights of the Abkhaz ethnic 
group, and this is quite important since post-IDP return Abkhazia will be 
demographically Kartvelian dominated. The only place in the Constitution where 
something is specified about the Abkhaz ethnos and/or culture, is Art. 8, that proclaims 
Abkhaz and Georgian to be Abkhazia's official languages.386 This is the only article that 
comes close to guaranteeing RAdU. 
 The RG has on a few occasions proposed solutions that entail quite a high level of 
desire fulfilment for the Abkhaz, most recently on March 28 2008. That proposal 
involved "wide federalism"; joint free economic zones in East Abkhazia; ethnic Abkhaz 
representation in the RG Parl. with veto power over Abkhazian affairs; an Abkhaz Vice 
Pres. at the Federate level (earlier, the South Ossetians had been offered the same); 
Federal assistance in preserving RA culture; and a gradual merging of the two entities' 
security structures.387 This combination of central representation, federalism and ethnic 
power-sharing was RA refused by the RA as propaganda prior to the Bucharest NATO 
meeting, and they reclined to discuss anything else than a "peace treaty."388 Subsequently, 
RG Parl. Speaker Nino Burjanadze declared that this refusal did not represent "the real 
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mood of the Abkhaz people," but RF pressure.389 The quick demise of Tbilisi's proposal 
illustrates the basic distrust of the RA towards the current RG Gov.  
 
7.2. The Issue Level: The rights of the parties 
Though the RA’s recognition is marginal/non-existent, it does have a certain degree of 
"issue level" recognition: Their recognition as a party in the conflict gives them 
considerable rights to control RAdU. In addition to the Moscow Accords, that give 
Abkhazia the right to an own Constitution and state symbols,390 they have a place at the 
relevant tables – giving them possibilities to practice behavioural power. One such power 
available to them is "the walkout option": They can punish the RG by freezing 
negotiations.391 Furthermore, the RA may refuse to accept certain frameworks for 
negotiations: This was what happened when the GF in 2001 proposed the Boden Plan.392 
When pressed again in 2003 they still refused,393 and in 2008 they told the GF that if they 
did not stop insisting on the Boden Plan it could spell the end of all negotiations,394 and 
questioned their neutrality.395  
 The main framework for negotiations is the so-called "Geneva Process" that 
started in 1997. An important element in point of this process is the Coordinating 
Council (CC), which is led by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General 
(SRUNSG), facilitated by the RF and has the OSCE and GF as observers.396 The parties 
are defined as the RG and the RA, constructing an equality between them that is absent in 
"aggregate" terms. On the other hand, the "Sochi Process" that started in 2003, seems at 
face value to threaten the RA’s place at the table – the main parties here are the RF and 
the RG, with the RA participating only in parts of the talks and in working group 
activities.397 The Pro-RG critic Vladimir Socor, however, accuses the Sochi Process of 
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presenting Tbilisi with a "united front" of the RF and the RA398 According to European 
Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) the RG was disappointed with the Sochi Process as it 
in practice dealt much with the railway and little with the IDPs.399 The RA seem to be – 
normally, they react vocally whenever they feel they are being "nudged" out of an 
opportunity to affect the conflict. E.g. Gvindzhiya attacked a 2007 conference in Berlin 
that involved all the SC's de jure states but no unrecognized ones as "a waste of time": 
Any [discussion on settlement in the Abkhazian Conflict] without the participation of Abkhazia is 
absolutely meaningless. First, the picture of the situation which is created in this case for the Council 
of Europe is completely partial, as the Georgian interpretation, as a rule, is far from the reality of the 
situation. Secondly, any decision or recommendation adopted without regard to the Abkhaz side is 
unviable because their implementation is not possible if there is no agreement of both sides400 
Finally, there used to be a less formal process called the "Schleining Process" which 
consisted of meetings between politicians as private individuals.401 This process was 
discontinued during the period, according to Kvarcheliya.402  
 At the beginning of the period under analysis, all negotiations were "down" due to 
the October Events. After the Rose Revolution the parties met within the Sochi Process 
frames, and the Geneva process was also reanimated403 - but this did not last long: The 
RA walked out after the RG fired on a freight vessel outside Sokhumi on July 30 2004. 
Only weekly quadripartite meetings404 in Gali still went on. Also, the parties' Joint fact-
finding group was operative again already in December 2004.405  After Sergey Bagapsh' RA 
Gov. came to power in 2005, negotiations resumed - but Sokhumi withdrew again after 
six months, this time due to Tbilisi arresting a Turkish ship headed for the RA on July 3 
2005406 despite RA warnings that all talks would be broken off if RG vessels kept 
"intruding" into "their" seas.407 Negotiations were up again already in August, but once 
more a crisis during the summer broke off all meetings. After the Kodori Crisis of 2006, 
the RA has consistently refused to talk with the RG until the resulting grievances are 
addressed.  
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 Just as the issue level rights boost the RA's power over RAdU, it reduces the RG's 
control over RGdU stemming from the aggregate level. Like the RA, the RG has troop 
limitations in the SZ and RAZ, obligations not to attack RA-controlled areas408 and 
responsibility to prevent paramilitary activity.409 But if limitations and obligations were 
followed, the Abkhazian Conflict would look rather different. For one thing, the RG's 
2006 operation in Upper Kodori and subsequent stationing of forces was not in line with 
the Moscow Accords.410 Likewise, the use of drones has been labelled as a breach of the 
Accords by the RA and RF – though Tbilisi claims that the drones are not armed and 
therefore do not violate any agreements.411 And of course, if the RA followed the 
Accords, the Kartvelian majority would have been reinstated a long time ago. 
 
 
8. Social cohesion 
8.1. The Republic of Abkhazia: A democratizing ethnocracy 
At the outset of the period under analysis, the RAS was very weak. Parts of Abkhazia were 
totally outside RA control (Upper Kodori), others only to a minimal extent (Gali) and 
everywhere else crime was rampant. Power abuse and corruption were also major 
problems, and press freedom was marred by repeated attacks on e.g. the critical 
newspaper Nuzhnaya.412 Several opposition parties were founded, among those the war 
veterans' party Amtsakhara. This movement drew broad support, and in 2002 called on 
voters to boycott Parl. elections, stating that this was just a "façade" masking total RA 
Gov. control.413 But the opposition was not united: Other important parties included 
businessman Aleksandr Ankvab's Aytayra and United Akhazia. Kvarcheliya claimed that 
some of the disagreements had to do with respect for the political "rules of the game": 
When [Amtsakhara] established themselves, you know, they (…) were not speaking about elections, 
they demanded [Ardzinba's] resignation at a mass rally. Aytayra and also the NGOs did not support it. 
The NGOs agreed with Amtsakhara that Ardzinba was too ill to rule, and we disagreed with things he 
did, but we wanted Parliament to start a process of impeachment or wait until his term expired. We 
were allies in not supporting Ardzinba, but did not support their tactics.414 
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Despite discontent with the regime, the RA sovereignty project in itself did not come 
under attack, not from opposition movements nor the critical media.415 The RF, among 
others, claims that the 1990s' embargo did not at all erode loyalty, but strengthened it by 
creating a "siege mentality".416 Sokhumi claims that in their 1999 Constitutional 
referendum, an 87.6% turnout voted near unanimously for sovereignty417 and when the 
October Events caused forced integration into the RG to seem a real threat, even one of 
the most disgruntled groups - the war veterans - agreed to be mobilized.418  
 In the 2004 Pres elections, the candidature of PM Raul' Khadzhimba was endorsed 
by both Ardzinba and Moscow. Khadzhimba, known to be pro-RF and a former KGB 
employee, had a widely publicized meeting with Putin before the elections419 and posters 
of the two were omnipresent in Abkhazia.420 But a consolidating opposition caused 
trouble for the would-be Pres: In July, United Abkhazia and Amtsakhara agreed to launch 
Bagapsh (former PM and then CEO of the RA national energy company)421 as their joint 
Pres. candidate and Stanislav Lakoba as Vice Pres. candidate.422 Ankvab was disqualified 
from running after he refused to take a language test (though the authorities admitted he 
spoke Abkhaz fluently) and for having lived insufficiently long in the RA.423 Aytayra 
criticised the regime for "dirty tricks" and flagged support for Bagapsh, whose bloc 
offered Ankvab the post of PM in a future government. Thus, the regime's repressive 
methods helped unite the opposition.424 Bagapsh' program and rhetoric was to a large 
extent focused on economic issues and democratization:  
In case we win the elections, we will not rule Abkhazia but govern the state and serve the people (...) a 
transparent, open and accessible authority (...) the decisive word will be with the people.425 
 
Errors and omissions in the development of people power, civil society and democracy, inefficient 
economic leadership in the years that have gone by keep stimulating the processes of degradation, 
spiritual and material impoverishment of the republic's citizens.426  
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Bagapsh said a choice had to be made between "market conditions or a planned 
economy", and rule of law was a precondition for the first of these.427 He also linked 
lacking recognition and military weakness to the bad RAE situation.428 Though Bagapsh' 
voters are often portrayed as RF-sceptics,429 Bagapsh never advocated weakening these 
ties: He openly argued for associated membership in the Russian Federation "at the 
present stage," and desired an "integration of the Russian economy into ours, and ours 
into the Russian". He cited the relationship between Lichtenstein and Switzerland as an 
ideal,430 and defined the RA as "an independent state under Russia's patronage".431 His 
more radical running mate Lakoba emphasised the need to focus on Europe and not only 
the RF.432 Regarding the non-Abkhaz population, Bagapsh' program said little, but it did 
state that "Abkhazia is a multinational country"433 and argued for "equality in rights, 
freedoms and opportunities".434 Again, Lakoba was more explicit, desiring increased 
representation of other ethnic groups in the administration.435 Still, Kvarcheliya says that 
"[Bagapsh' bloc] made a point about being oriented towards the minorities, and were 
more popular among them. [Khadzhimba's bloc] is more nationalist".  
 When the results were presented in October the authorities claimed Khadzhimba 
had won with 52,8% over Bagapsh' 33,6% and that Shamba, who ran independently, had 
garnered 10%;436 while the opposition claimed Bagapsh had won with more than half the 
total vote.437 Both sides accused each other of fraud438 (Khadzhimba stating that in Gali, 
Kartvelians had voted without being entitled to)439 and the volcano erupted: Armed 
groupings rushed to the capital440 and official buildings were seized by Bagapsh' 
supporters.441 The situation grew so tense as to resemble a brewing civil war, but the 
candidates and Ardzinba eventually sat down to bargain - with RF representatives present 
- and in December they had reached an agreement: A joint ticket with Bagapsh running 
                                                 
427 www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/709252.html 
428 www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/pop/interview/id/707960.html 
429 www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=7963 
430 www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/709252.html 
431 www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/pop/interview/id/707960.html 
432 www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/690780.html) 
433 It should be noted that the incumbents also had referred to the Abkhazians as "a multinational people", so this was not all 
that radical (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/667378.html) 
434 www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/pop/interview/id/707960.html) 
435 www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/690780.html) 
436 www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/710773.html) 
437 www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/710855.html 
438 www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/711528.html 
439 www.civil.ge/eng/detail.php?id=8000 
440 www.iwpr.net/?p=crs&s=f&o=158675&apc_state=henicrs2004 
441 iwpr.net/pdf/100crs_eng.pdf p. 107 
 66
for Pres. and Khadzhimba as Vice Pres, while Lakoba was promised "a prominent 
position" and ended up as leader of the RA SC442 when the new team won a 90,1% 
victory.443 Though the opposition came out on top, there are allegations that the RF 
imposed the compromise - e.g. from Coppieters, who also claims that Russia "retains the 
power to veto crucial political decisions".444 Still, there are widespread claims that in fact 
it is PM Ankvab and not Khadzhimba who is the real second in command. E.g. 
Kvarcheliya says that "[Khadzhimba] is not very much a political figure anymore, very 
weak and dependable."445 When confronted with this on a 2008 Lenta Q&A, Bagapsh 
strongly denied it.446  
                                                
 The events described here can be seen as the second "colour revolution"447 to 
occur in the Post-Soviet area if we apply the following criteria: (i) An authoritarian elite is 
replaced by a group promising democratization, after (ii) basically non-violent popular 
protests against (iii) allegedly falsified elections benefiting (iv) a candidate supported by 
the RF. Being smaller in scope than the simultaneously occurring Orange Revolution, but 
definitely a "relative" of it, one may refer to Abkhazia's colour revolution as the 
"Tangerine Revolution". Kvarcheliya described it as a democratic victory over RF 
influence:   
The incumbents and Russia used enormous resources, but they lost. People voted for Bagapsh, not 
necessarily because they liked him so much, but because they wanted change. They even went against 
Russia, which was risky. This is our only semi-ally. They risked their only ally, to keep them from 
interfering to such an extent. I think that was an important step in political participation. So, there is a 
process of democratization.448 
But while feeling that Abkhazia is democratizing, both Kvarcheliya and Ketsba 
underlined that not all is rosy in the Abkhazian democracy. For one thing, the party 
system has great flaws: 
You know, we do not have parties here in the sense that you do in the West. They don't really exist. 
Two or three months after elections, they fall apart. (...) I was one of the leaders of [Aytayra] That's 
the party that supported Bagapsh'. It died after the president was elected.449  
 
It’s difficult to talk about political parties in Abkhazia. Most parties are created for elections (...) The 
politicians are themselves saying now that we need laws on parties and proportional representation. 
Once the block of two parties – Bagapsh’ and the prime minister’s – won, the parties died. (...) The 
 
442 www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1033660.html 
443 www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/753760.html) 
444 Coppieters 2007, p. 18 
445 Author's interview with Kvarcheliya. 
446 www.lenta.ru/conf/abkhazia/ 
447 The third colour revolution, if you count what happened in Ajara in 2004 (see 8.2).  
448 Author's interview with Kvarcheliya. 
449 Author's interview with Ketsba. 
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party of the former elite was a fiction. Now that they are the opposition, they are better organized, 
they want to get back in power.450 
The opposition ― that is, groups supporting the Vice Pres. instead of Bagapsh ― only got 
20% of the RA Parl. seats in the 2007 elections, and subsequently accused the ruling bloc 
of cheating by letting people who "left their villages 10-20 years ago" vote and handing 
out Formula #9 documents to people with instructions to vote for them451 - once more 
attacking the AKs and IDPs. The Editor-in-Chief of Chegemskaya Pravda predicted this 
loss – saying that while people were somewhat disappointed in Bagapsh, "no one wants a 
return to the past."452 
 In addition to the somewhat dysfunctional parties there are many NGOs active in 
Abkhazia, cooperating with each other and actively trying to influence the agenda. 
Particularly interesting is that both NGO activists I interviewed in Sokhumi were 
involved in cooperation with NGOs in Gali, and Kvarcheliya also had ties to Armenian 
activists. While Abkhazia is a small "country," such inter-ethnic co-operations are not 
given after an ethnic war. Regarding the media situation there are four newspapers and 
two TV channels in today's RA – a private channel having been started in 2007 by tourist 
industry businessman and "centrist" politician Beslan Budba. Kvarcheliya sees 
independent media's and civil society's role in the RA as important, since she holds the 
opposition to be undemocratic and incapable of "constructive criticism." She claims that 
"freedom of speech and media is the strongest part of our democracy" but even so 
indicated that media debate had little effect on the politicians' agenda. Both Kvarcheliya 
and Ketsba also complained that courts are "under heavy influence from the executive 
and also the Parliament".453  
The highest potential for instability, however, lies neither in the party system nor 
the media situation – but in ethnic discrimination. The constitution of the current RA 
Parl. makes the RA a glaring example of ethnocracy: Out of the 35 representatives, 
74,3% are Abkhaz.454 Nuzhnaya said that this is "almost exactly the same ethnic 
breakdown as the last [RA Parl]" and expressed worry that the representatives would not 
"stand up for the interests of their respective 
                                                 
450 Author's interviews with Kvarcheliya 
451 kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1182186.html 
452 ww.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=14481 
453 Author's interviews with Kvarcheliya and Ketsba 
454 The remaining 9 are 3 Russians, 3 AAs, 2 AGs and 1 Turk. The "Turk", Vladimir Nachach-Ogly (see 9), is in some 
rapports counted as Abkhaz (www.regnum.ru/english/polit/798212.html republics) 
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communities."455 The system may be particularly difficult to change through reform since 
it is informal – "certain electoral districts have been traditionally represented by 
individuals of a certain ethnicity" according to Kerselyan.456 While the non-Abkhaz seem 
to accept the situation, Kvarcheliya thinks that the Armenians may "go in[to politics] if 
they feel their business interests are jeopardized." Worryingly, there are also issues 
between Abkhaz and AAs apart from the systematic discrimination: In January 2006 the 
Council of Armenian Community was so concerned over anti-Armenian leaflets and 
"sabotage" (a primitive bomb, reportedly)457 against an Armenian school in Sokhumi that 
they confronted Bagapsh.458 He admitted that the RA Gov. had not paid enough 
attention to the AAs' situation and promised increased focus. Khadzhimba, on the other 
hand, denied that there were Abkhaz-Armenian conflicts.459 In 2008, when Bagapsh was 
asked in a Q&A about "the growing tension between Abkhaz and Armenians," Bagapsh 
insisted that there was "no tension" and blamed the "PR-structures of Georgia."460  
In the course of this Q&A, Bagapsh constructs a highly interesting ethnic 
hierarchy where those who are neither Abkhaz nor Kartvelians form a middle class: He 
keeps emphasizing their Kartvelian-induced suffering, that they acknowledge the Abkhaz 
right to rule Abkhazia and he praises some of them for having "laid their children on the 
altar of our victory" during the war. When Bagapsh talks about Kartvelians, his speech is 
borderline orientalizing at times ("[Georgia] is a country of very emotional people, 
sometimes their emotions run counter to a thoughtful approach to certain questions")461 
though he bestows a certain accept upon the Gali AKs: They "take part in the political 
life of the republic" and are "our citizens like all other inhabitants of Abkhazia".462 Also, 
Gvindzhiya states that "a lot of the people in Gali didn’t fight during the war. They did 
not want to be involved on Shevardnadze’s side, they supported Gamsakhurdia."463 
 Still, the Gali AKs are by far the most disenfranchised group in the country, in 
addition to being at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder. Their region is controlled 
                                                 
455 www.armeniandiaspora.com/forum/archive/index.php/t-85598.html 
456 yandunts.blogspot.com/2007/06/abkhazia-and-its-armenians.html 
457 www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=11501 
458 www.panarmenian.net/news/eng/?nid=16008&date=2006-01-16 
459 www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=14498 
460 www.lenta.ru/conf/abkhazia/ 
461 He does, though, also state that the Abkhaz and the Kartvelians are quite "similar concerning character and mentality" 
(Op. cit). 
462 Op. cit. 
463 Author's interview with Gvindzhiya. 
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by Abkhaz police forces and CISPK, and run by a representative of the RA Gov 
(currently Ruslan Khismariya). Due to infrastructure problems this police force never 
actually prevents crime, as they always get to the scene too late according to Todia. 
Particularly Lower Gali is dangerous: "If you go there, you do not know what will happen. 
Maybe you will be all right, but…"464 Todia and others claim that while particularly the 
harvest sees a lot of crime ― armed raids on houses – kidnappings for ransom occur 
around the year, to the extent that a common problem for the UNOMIG is finding out 
whether kidnappings or murders are related to the conflict or just crime.465 On a positive 
note; several sources claim that Gali's crime rates have fallen in the latter years.466 But as 
if ethnocracy, crime and stark poverty were not enough, the Gali Kartvelians also have to 
live with sanctions from the RG: During the 2007 Parl. elections locals were harassed by 
paramilitaries: 
The head of the village administration in Lower Gali, Fridon Chakaberia, a Mingrelian (...) 65 or 70 
years old (...) was arrested on the Georgian side for carrying drugs (...). It’s outrageous. He’s not that 
kind of person. He was very clearly being punished for collaborating. A lot of NGOs monitored his 
situation (...) so they had to release him (...). David Sigua, the head of the district election committee, 
was abducted and reportedly killed by Georgian interior police. (...) So after this, people in Gali were 
terrified to vote. They were urged by Abkhazian authorities to vote anyway. In a way, that was 
pressure too (...). But they also received more pressure from Georgia. They have Georgian phone 
connections in Gali – it works better than ours – and people in line to vote received phone calls from 
Georgia, people calling them and threatening them. "We see you through our binoculars, we see you 
at the voting station. You are a traitor. We will kill your son who studies in Tbilisi". People were 
scared and also angry they called them traitors. They want peace and stability to live normal lives, but 
they are squeezed between the two sides.467 
A final note on RAS is that as of 2008 Upper Kodori is even more definitely outside RA 
control, while the measure of control the RA has over the rest of Abkhazia is the same: 
Gali is still more quiescent than it is actively controlled, and organized crime/corruption 
is still rampant throughout the "country". The police are so defunct that many rely on 
criminal groupings instead, according to Ketsba: "If you go to the police first, the [mafia] 
won't help you. If you go directly to them and give them money, $1000 for a car, they'll 
get it back for you." The PM himself has experienced four attempts on his life since 2005 
– organized crime is blamed - and still nobody has been caught.468 Thus, while the 
democratization leads RAS to be clearly better than under Ardzinba's reign, the situation 
is far from good and there is a plethora of sources for instability. 
 
                                                 
464 Author's interview with Todia 
465 Author's interview with Bringedal 
466 Author's interviews with Kvarcheliya and Todia; www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1102300.html 
467 Author's interview with Kvarcheliya 
468 www.kommersant.com/p781327/assassination_breakaway_republics 
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8.2. Georgia: A Rose with many Thorns 
Social cohesion says a lot about the extent to which they RG controls RGdU, as RGdU 
defined as building a stable state within the GSSR's borders. Thus, Tbilisi's desired utility 
is for RGS to be as good as possible. The other variables simply relate to RGdU by way of 
affecting the RG's possibilities for capturing more control of it.  
 Prior to the Rose Revolution, a number of opposition groups had gathered against 
Shevardnadze's increasingly unpopular rule. The largest of them were ex-Min. of Justice 
(Min. J) Mikheil Saakashvili's United National Movement (UNM) and the three-party bloc 
Burjanadze-Democrats (BD) led by Burjanadze and Zurab Zhvania. The Rose Revolution 
started in November 2003 when the Central Election Committee (CEC) declared that in 
the first round of the Parl. elections, Shevardnadze's bloc For a New Georgia (FNG)469 had 
won; and the runner-ups were the Revival Party (RP) of Ajara's dictator and Presidential 
envoy to Abkhazia Aslan Abashidze.470 UNM's bloc471 came in 3rd and the BD 5th472, after 
the pro-Western socialist Labour Party (LP).473 The TV-channels Imedi and Rustavi-2 
reported irregularities, and OSCE stated that elections "fell short of a number of 
international standards."474 After much civil unrest, CEC announced the final results on 
November 20: FNG was still on top, but now followed by the UNM bloc. Fair Elections, 
the RGs largest independent monitoring group claimed that the UNM bloc won and the 
BD defeated the RP and the LP. Saakashvili claimed victory for himself and "the 
opposition in general", promising "a completely new life with a new parliament".475 When 
Shevardnadze tried to convene the new RG Parl, massive demonstrations ensued. The 
military and police showed a clear lack of support for the incumbent Pres, who eventually 
resigned on November 23.476 When new Pres. elections were held in January 2004, 
Saakashvili won these with 96%.477 The UNM united with Zhania's forces and the bloc 
won a landslide in the March 2004 Parl. election, getting 152 of 224 seats.478 The Rose 
Revolution fundamentally changed the RG political landscape – providing a whole new 
                                                 
469Georgia: Parliamentary Elections November 2003 (NORDEM 2004)*, p. 2. The bloc included Nadareishvili's Abkhazia's 
Liberation Party. 
470Op. cit, p. 3, 16. Abashidze won with a suspicious 95% success in Ajara. 
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legitimacy and popularity to the regime, thus boosting RGS. Saakashvili claimed that the 
Rose Revolution had "at its core one simple demand – the creation of a stable, equitable, 
and functional democracy" and already in 2004 told the UN General Assembly (UNGA) 
that "we have accomplished that demand, in ways that few abroad or at home ever 
imagined possible". He said the rule of law was re-instated, lasting systemic change had 
occurred and that his Gov. would build "bridges, not bases (...) roads, and not rockets".479 
 Despite Saakashvili’s initially high popular support, by 2007 Georgia was a deeply 
unstable country where the ruling elite's popular legitimacy was low. Saakashvili had done 
much to fight lower level corruption and created more wealth. He had not, however, 
incorporated all of the RG's claimed areas, returned the IDPs, gone after top level 
corruption or prioritized the social sphere.480 The ICG's 2008 report Georgia: Sliding 
Towards Authoritarianism? claims that discontent had been growing steadily for years481 
before it exprloded in 2007. The catalyst was Irakli Okruashvili, who had left the RG Gov 
in November2006 after being reassigned from Min. D to Min. of Economy after stating 
that he would resign if he did not celebrate New Years Eve 2006 in his hometown 
Tskhinvali.482 Now he was back with his own opposition party, Movement for a United 
Georgia,483 and accused Saakashvili of "fascist tendencies": 
The style of Saakashvili’s governance (...) has made dishonesty, injustice and oppression a way of life. 
Everyday repression, demolition of houses and churches, robbery, ‘kulakization’, and murders, I 
would stress, murders, have become common practice for the authorities.484 
He accused the RG Pres. of selectiveness in the battle against corruption; continuing 
Shevardnadze's "Apartheid-type mentality" against IDPs from Abkhazia and 
"Samachablo"; undermining the Orthodox Church; and failing to incorporate South 
Ossetia: He claimed the RG was "only a step away from reclaiming one of our lost 
territories," but it was frustrated by Saakashvili's "incapability, weakness and inability to 
take a political and historical decision"485 He said there had been a plan to launch a "small 
scale operation" with "a minimum of casualties,"486 but this plan had been replaced by the 
                                                 
479 www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=7894. Regarding bases and rockets, one should note that since 2004 the RG defence 
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creation of the Sanakoev Administration.487 Finally, he claimed that Saakashvili had told 
him to have businessman and Imedi owner Badri Patarkatsishvili murdered.488 Two days 
later Okruashvili was arrested on a number of charges, and later exiled,489 but his words 
had struck a chord: Massive demonstrations ensued490 and ten opposition parties united 
in a campaign for reforms and new elections.491  Patarkatsishvili's flagging of support for 
the opposition caused sanctions against Imedi,492 and after coverage of opposition 
activities the station was shut down brutally on accusations of spreading messages to 
overthrow the government. The RG Gov. labelled the opposition a "black, dark force" 
funded by "a concrete oligarch Russian source"493 ― rather unlikely, considering 
Okruashvili's "hawkish" policies and that Patrikatishvili was a former Berezovskiy ally.494 
On November 7 non-violent protestors were treated with truncheons and tear gas, 
opposition leaders beaten up and a state of emergency declared.495 After much 
international pressure, Saakashvili gave in:496  The state of emergency was cancelled, new 
Pres. elections were promised for January 2008 and Imedi returned to the air497 - briefly, 
as in January 2008 the RG once again seized control. 498 When Patarkatsishvili died not 
much later, 70% of Imedi fell into the hands of his US-American cousin Joseph Kay who 
was accused of being an RG Gov. ally.499 As for the snap elections, the opposition failed 
to unite: Okruashvili was exiled and Patarkatsishvili fell out with other opposition leaders 
but ran anyway;500 and though a "united opposition" candidate was found in centre-right 
Levan Gachechliadze, the LP and three other parties launched their own candidates. 
Saakashvili won with a clear majority, but voter turnout was low (see Fig. 5). The 
opposition called the elections unfair, and there were claims that Gachechiladze in reality 
won, or at least earned a second round against Saakashvili.501 In addition to a general 
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marked drop in regime popularity, one should not overlook the fact that Saakashvili lost 
Tblisi to Gachechiladze502 ― a dangerous fact in a country where regimes have never 
once changed without the active involvement of masses gathering in the capital. Since the 
election, Saakashvili has been in sharp conflict with the opposition, to the point where 
opposition members refuse to negotiate with him and only agree to meet with 
Burjanadze.503 
Fig. 8: The rise and fall of Saakashvili's popularity. 504 
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9. Interactions and Conflict Intensity 
9.1. Fall 2003 – Fall 2004: Georgian revolutions, Abkhaz suspicions 
At the time of the Rose Revolution the RA initially claimed "no interest" in who won the 
elections in "another state",505 but following Saakashvili's victory they signalled readiness 
to start discussions again.506 They did attempt to set a few preconditions, though, which 
included abolishing the Government of Abkhazia in Exile (GAE, the leadership of ARA) 
and the paramilitary groups, and signing a treaty excluding military means of conflict 
solution.507 While these preconditions were later dropped,508 several items on the list were 
addressed by the RG: Saakashvili committed to peaceful solutions several times during 
2004,509, paramilitary activity in East Abkhazia was largely discontinued,510 Nadareishvili 
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(who favoured a military solution to the conflict) resigned from the GAE,511 and the 12 
"Abkhazian delegates" to the RG Parl. lost their seats.512,513 In May 2004 a group led by 
former deputy Min. J. Kote Kublashvili handed a proposal on Abkhazia to the RG 
National SC that envisioned a Boden-type514 federation and full IDP return, but ensured 
effective Abkhaz influence at the central and local level: The Abkhaz would get the 
majority of Parl. seats in Abkhazia, and representation at the Federal level with veto 
power over Abkhazian issues. The Abkhazian Pres. would have to speak Abkhaz (and 
standard Georgian), Abkhazia would be sovereign in all issues not related to foreign 
policy and security, and retain their police force.515 While Shamba found this too little,516 
Saakashvili found it too much: His offer on September 21 2004 was limited to "the fullest 
and broadest form of autonomy" within the RG.517 
 May also saw the culmination of the RG's conflict with Ajara. During the Rose 
Revolution Abashidze had made steps for Ajara to secede, and declared a local state of 
emergency. Following military movements close to their "borders", Abashidze now 
ordered the destruction of all bridges into the rest of Georgia but was taken aback by 
massive local pro-Saakashvili demonstrations. Saakashvili imposed direct rule, while 
Abashidze was offered exile in Russia and left. The peaceful and popularly supported 
incorporation of Ajara is seen as a "Second Rose Revolution" by some,518 while in 
Abkhazia the RA Parl. saw the hands of "the radical wing of Georgian aggressive 
nationalism" and expressed worry that an "illusion" would arise in Tbilisi that the scenario 
could be repeated. It stated that while the Ajars were Kartvelians and Ajara "part of 
Georgia" ― the Abkhaz and Abkhazia were not. They emphasised that in contrast to the 
Ajars they had led an "anti-colonial struggle".519 On July 1 2004 "all strategic areas of 
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governance" in Ajara were transferred to Tbilisi despite promises of retained autonomy. 
520 Coppieters summed up the centre's new power over the old autonomy as "excessive", 
and the arrangement was also criticised by the Council of Europe.521 Internal opposition 
was also heard: MP Davit Gamkrelidze claimed that "a nominal autonomy, which is a 
direct presidential rule and in reality [sic] is an even worse sign for both Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia."522 The incident left the RA with a bad impression of Tbilisi's willingness 
to share power – or indeed keep promises at all. The South Ossetian conflict also erupted 
in May, but no success for the RG. This seeming attempt to "repeat the Ajarian scenario" 
caused heightened RAint, as demonstrated by Khadzhimba's promise of military aid to the 
RSO in case of full scale war.523 By then, however, RA-RG negotiations had already been 
broken off due to RG sanctions against naval traffic headed for Sokhumi. 
 By September, conflict intensions were again at a level where Saakashvili deemed it 
appropriate to launch a full condemnation of the RA in a speech to the UNGA. He 
derided the RA as downright dangerous, linking Sokhumi to international terrorism:  
uncontrolled zones breed crime, drug trafficking, arms trading and most notable, terrorism. (...) And 
in places like Abkhazia (...) these lawless zones have the potential to affect European security as long 
as they remain unresolved. The lawless territories (...) are not only safe havens for mini-dictatorships 
(...) tightly controlled by elite groups that seek to profit from the criminal status quo. In these 
extremely closed societies – by in large cut off from the rest of the world ― it causes me great pain 
that children there grow up with guns instead of books in their hands and that their heads are filled 
with hatred and intolerance, instead of respect for difference and appreciation for cultural 
diversity. We must put an end to this cycle of destruction.524 
Contrary to later rhetoric, the RF is in this speech constructed as a potential partner of the 
RG – they have "common enemies" in the NC terrorists, the same people who unleashed 
"bloodshed in the name of Abkhaz separatism". He mentions Tskhinvali, Grozniy and 
Sokhumi as a joint problem complex, and lauds Putin for resolving to "do away with the 
Basayevs of the world."525 Despite clashes over alleged Russian violations of RG 
airspace526 and the RF decision to open railways Sochi-Sokhumi,527 the RG was still not 
quite framing Russia as a party in the conflict.  
  
9.2. Fall 2004: The "Tangerine Revolution" 
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Civil Georgia reported that the RG had high hopes for a new Abkhaz leader – though the 
elections were of course denounced.528 As the events began to resemble the Rose 
Revolution, Min. of Conflict Resolution (Min. CR) Georgi Khaindrava said he had hopes 
that a Bagapsh victory could soften pressure on Gali, claiming that Bagapsh had much of 
his base there.529 He did however see a hypothetical Khadzhimba victory as useful also: 
Tbilisi and Moscow would eventually "get closer", he beleived, and then it would be very 
advantageous to have an RA Pres. that would "follow all of Moscow's instructions."530 As 
the situation in Abkhazia deteriorated, the impact of popular attitudes to the RG and the 
RF became increasingly pronounced: Ardzinba claimed a "Tbilisi scenario" was being 
enacted ― a "crawling coup" with an "experienced puppet-master" – and said he would 
do "everything possible" to protect "our independence". 531 Bagapsh, on his side, openly 
criticised the RF for "meddling" with the elections.532 The final compromise was badly 
received by both camps, according to International War and Peace Reporting (IWPR): 
Amtsakhara's co-chair Vladimir Nachach-Ogly accused Bagapsh of being "fooled by the 
Russian security agencies and Ardzinba. (...) They won’t let him be president"533 while 
Khadzhimba supporters were baffled that their man would cooperate with "stooges of 
the West and Tbilisi".534 Khaindrava stated as the most important thing that "the Abkhaz 
people did not allow for an appointment of [their] President from Moscow"535 while RG 
Min. FA Salome Zourabichvili praised the events as a small victory for democracy that 
the Abkhaz did not "hand over their future and fate to Moscow".536 Already in 
December, Saakashvili stated that the majority of Abkhazia's current residents had voted 
for Bagapsh and that the RG would hence meet with no other leader of the Abkhaz.537 
 
9.3. Spring 2005 – Spring 2006: The long détente 
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The Bagapsh Gov. started its relationship with the RG by clarifying that federalism was 
still not an option538 and independence "not negotiable,"539 but also signalled readiness to 
resume negotiations540 and called for meetings between the leaders – though setting as a 
precondition for the latter that the parties sign the declaration on non-violence,541 and 
that talks should be on the basis of the Sochi Process.542 RG PM Zhvania attempted to 
link negotiation resumptions with the RA admitting ethnic cleansing.543 This position has 
been left, however ― perhaps due to Zhvania's death under disputed circumstances a 
week or so later.544 Meetings took place in Geneva on April 07-08 2005 and the RG Pres. 
envoy to the conflict Irakli Alasania was "very positive" to the RA's agreement on issues 
involving Gali, the IDPs and economic questions. Khaindrava, however, expressed 
scepticism to whether the RA and RF were "sincere".545 The RG suggested opening a 
railway line between Sokhumi and the de facto RG546, but linked this to full return of 
IDPs, which was unacceptable to the RA. In the summer, all negotiations stopped up 
again due to another instance of maritime disagreements; to which the RG reacted very 
harshly: Khaindrava labelled as "absurd" the RA's position that no meetings would be 
held until confiscated cargo had been returned, and accused them of deliberately 
thwarting the Geneva Process. Another RG Gov. official commented that the cargo issue 
had not prevented the RA from participating in Sochi Process-meetings over the 
railways.547  
 In August the parties had a couple of meetings involving Shamba and Khaindrava 
that were seen as positive,548 and the same month two low points of conflict intensity 
occured: Lakoba claimed that "some kind of confederation" was not totally out of the 
question, and on the anniversary of the conflict's beginning (August 14) Alasania stated 
that sending troops into Abkhazia had been "a big mistake which led to a huge 
tragedy."549 This is the closest the RG has ever come to formally apologizing for the 
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attack on Abkhazia in 1992. On the whole, however, the the fall saw a raise in conflict 
intensity: The RG protested vehemently to the RA's major military exercise on August 
15-19, accusing them of illegaly utilizing their ZRA. The CISPK actually confirmed this, 
but said they turned a blind eye since the RG did the same thing in their ZRA.550 Also, 
Bagapsh sharpened his rhetoric on the need for Gali AKs to accept RA and/or RF 
passports, and the control of RG passport holders was strengthened - also drawing 
reactions from Tbilisi.551 Another thing that served to sour relations was that the RA 
refused admittance to the RG's members of the three-party expert group that was to 
assess the condition of the Abkhazian railway ― on the grounds that they were AK 
IDPs. The RG refused to accept such discrimination, and the work went on without 
them. Civil Georgia claims that this turn of events was particularly negative, since the RG 
had dropped its demand of linking the railway to the IDP question in order to participate 
― but now they were prevented anyway.552 The replacement of Kartvelian-language 
education in Gali with Russian was also condemned, and when the RA Gov. made 
statements about selling property left behind by the IDPs, Khaindrava reacted by 
referring to the RA as an "Apartheid regime."553 The latter issue was particularly 
highlighted by Saakashvili in his September 2005 speech to the UNGA,554 though it must 
be said that the most interesting change in Saakashvili's rhetoric from last year was his 
new framing of Russia: No longer a partner against global terrorism, Moscow was instead 
accused of leading a "forcible, lawless and immoral annexation" of RG territory, caused 
by a "19th century logic of territorial seizure."555 That very month Burjanadze presented a 
draft resolution on a statement demanding the withdrawal of the CISPK unless they 
showed signs of "improved" performance before July 15 2006.  
 In October 2005 the parties, with the RF and the UN, met in Sochi for 
discussions on the general SZ situation and IDP return to Gali.556 Two-party UN-led 
talks were planned557 but Bagapsh still insisted on a treaty of non-violence before 
meeting Saakashvili.558 By 2006 things had started to improve again: A four-party 
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meeting met to discuss the SZ, and agreed to establish a "hotline" between Sokhumi and 
Tbilisi.559 On March 20 2006 an obstacle was removed as Tblisi relieved Alasania from 
his position as GAE leader, and he now functioned only as the RG Pres. advisor on and 
envoy to Abkhazia. Prior to this the RA authorities had never formally met with 
Alasania, stating that they did not want to "legitimize" GAE.560 There had been informal 
meetings however, and Shamba said Alasania had always made a "positive 
impression".561 The first official meeting between them had been "extraordinarily 
fruitful" according to Shamba, and the sides decided to revive the CC.  Alasania 
announced that the RG side had started sketching out a "Road Map" – a new general 
approach to the Abkhazian Conflict ― which was to be ready by May 1. Alasania stated 
that "the previously existing policy, [envisaging] the isolation of the Abkhaz society [was] 
completely counterproductive."562 
                                                
 The CC met for the first time since the October Events on May 15, with Shamba 
and Khaindrava present. Both sides were satisfied, and SRUNSG Heidi Taglavini said that 
the parties now "demonstrated readiness for regular meetings".563 They agreed that the 
CC's working groups would meet in May and June in Gali, Sokhumi and Zugdidi.564 The 
joint declaration on non-resumption of violence still faced problems, however: The RG 
would not sign the document, as it specified that the PKs should be Russian. This was an 
issue Alasania refused to link with the general conflict: "On the one hand this is a bilateral 
[Georgian-Abkhaz] agreement and on the other hand discussions will take place in the 
near future about how appropriate this peacekeeping operation is".565 Not waiting idly for 
the delayed Road Map, the RA now presented an Abkhaz peace plan: The "Key to the 
Future", which offered to let IDPs return and become RA citizens if the RG apologized 
for their "war policy" and isolation of Abkhazia; stopped all economic and political 
pressure; and guaranteed the security of the RA's land, water and airspace. It also 
suggested that the UNSC should guarantee RA security,566 and of course advocated a 
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two-state solution. The RA Parl. reacted positively to all points in the "Key," except the 
IDPs returning.567 Khaindrava welcomed the initiative:  
Of course, at this stage we do not expect any sensational decisions (...), but the fact that Mr. Shamba 
has brought the document to Tbilisi [should be welcomed]. (...) there are issues [in the "Key"] which 
can be regarded as a basis for mutual understanding.568 
In the end of May, Saakashvili presented a set of principles that involved broad 
autonomy, the return of all IDPs and "guarantees for the Abkhaz ethnos." Khaindrava 
added RG territorial integrity and observance of human rights to the list, while not 
mentioning guarantees for the Abkhaz.569 Shamba now warned that "serious differences 
on many key issues" were emerging, but underlined that they wanted to continue the 
process.570 On June 1 he went public with the RA's concerns: They desired IDP returns 
exclusively to Gali, due to security concerns – warning that the war "had not yet vanished 
from people's memories" and "undesirable events" could occur if the IDPs returned to 
the rest of Abkhazia. The RG's "principles" were criticised for not containing 
"foundations for basic trust", and they suggested that the Key should serve as foundation 
for a common document on the conflict. He reaffirmed the RA's readiness for "lengthy 
negotiations."571 Eight days later Alasania finally presented "the Map": It entailed step-
by-step reforms aimed at a federative system, unconditional IDP return and protection 
of their rights, joint UN-OSCE offices in Sokhumi and Gali, ceasefire and a project to 
rehabilitate infrastructure and economy.572 Alasania recognized that the RA had earlier 
voiced discontent with many of these points, and ensured that the RG was "ready for 
consultations" and would "accept and consider any rational and constructive 
proposal."573 He was not very enthusiastic about "the Key", but saw some virtue in it: 
This key will fail to open any doors (...) the document has the systemized goals of secessionists. [But] 
there is no mention of Russia in the document [and] Abkhazia’s willingness to participate in Euro 
integration, as well as in [the] Black Sea regional cooperation is voiced574 
In the following days an extremely counterproductive rhetorical battle took place 
between Burjanadze and Shamba, the former stating that Abkhazia would not get 
independence as long as one Georgian remained alive, and the latter replying that 
Abkhazia would not stop fighting for independence as long as one Abkhaz remained 
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alive.575 Deputy Assistant to the US Secretary of State, Matthew Bryza, suggested that 
ideas from the Key and the Map could be combined into a common document,576 but to 
no avail.  
 The CISPK was becoming a major block to reach NA, as the RG increasingly saw 
their presence as destructive but the RA still did not seem to trust any other force than 
the RF. Alasania said he understood that the Abkhaz side "does not trust Tbilisi’s or other 
international guarantees" – but underscored that if the RG withdrew from the CIS, the 
CISPK's presence would be a problem;577 and that the CISPK "fails to meet its major 
mandate, which is the return of [IDPs] safely and in dignity".578 Little more than one year 
later, Gvindzhiya explained in an interview that he suspected the RG to harbour a more 
sinister long-term plan connected to the removal of CISPK: 
The final goal of Georgia, I think, is linked to the fact that if the Russian peacekeepers withdraw, the 
UN observers’ presence will be reviewed. Georgia will then insist that there is no need for UN 
observers, and insist on the OSCE to replace them. (...) They want Moldavians and Ukrainians to 
replace the UN. Georgia doesn’t say that openly, but these countries have said that they are ready to 
contribute – unlike any other country. [They] have very little experience, that’s one thing, and also 
they are open friends of Georgia and export arms to Georgia. It is understandable that Georgia wants 
this, but the positive role of Russian peacekeepers has been confirmed by numerous reports to the 
Secretary-General.579 
That summer, the RG accused the RF of reinforcing their military presence at the 
Gudauta base, something RA Min. D. Sosnaliev refuted.580 Bagapsh now threatened RA 
withdrawal from negotiations if the RG kept demanding CISPK withdrawal.581 He also 
said that should the CISPK leave, the RA would mine and fortify the "border", and invite 
"peackeepers" from the CDPR.582 Khaindrava claimed such words, in themselves, 
amounted to withdrawing from the negotiations.583 Not much later, Khaindrava was 
sacked and replaced with Merab Antadze after having criticised Okruashvili puclicly for 
his aggressive style that created "very serious problems" the RG,584 and for criticising 
central political figures over their involvement in a murder scandal. 585 Alasania also left 
the scene to become RG ambassador to the UN, seen by some as a concession to 
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hardliners.586 De Waal expressed worry that "the two moderate voices" in RA-RG 
negotiations were out, and worried about Okruashvili's increased influence.587 
 
9.4. Fall 2006: The Kodori Crisis 
On July 22 Emzar Kvitsiani's "Hunters" announced their defiance to Okruashvili's 
decision to dissolve and disarm them, and Kvitsiani demanded to be reinstated as local 
representative of the RG Pres. Tbilisi stated that this was a Russian provocation caused by 
the conflict over continued CISPK presence, and Burjandze accused Chaban and 
Sosnaliev of having recently met with Kvitsiani. These allegations were denied.588 
Kvitsiani was framed as a "traitor" one could not negotiate with by Saakashvili: 
The only issue I can negotiate with Kvitsiani and his gang – and this will happen only if they 
surrender arms – is about what kind of cells they will have in prison number five in Tbilisi. (...) 
Everyone who will betray Georgia, who (...) create problems for the country, will be defeated. I want 
our citizens to know that the President and his team will ‘make their mothers cry’ [a Georgian 
swearing expression] (...) These are the criminals who, when our people were fleeing Abkhazia in 
1993, were robbing and killing our [IDPs]. We have not demolished those people entirely and that is 
why they have emerged again.589 
Okruashvili later admitted to having given Kvitsiani an ultimatum prior to his 
announcement: Leave Upper Kodori or face armed intervention.590  
 Shamba adviced the RG to follow their example ― claiming that after the October 
Events, the RA could have taken and held the area themselves. They warned the RG that 
if they "lit a big fire," the RA would have to "react adequately",591 and as RG "police 
forces" moved towards Upper Kodori the RA moved armed forces into Lower 
Kodori.592 Certain RA NGOs’ demanded that negotiations should be broken off, but 
Bagapsh and Shamba insisted that this would be "premature," since the RA was 
achieving "good results" through current talks.593 When the "police operation" in Upper 
Kodori was over on July 27, they RG accused the RA of hiding Kvitsiani, something they 
denied.594 Saakashvili described the operation as a success, emphasising the strategic 
value of the "reclaimed" area "in the middle of Abkhazia (…) so close to Sokhumi." He 
underlined that the RG had no "aggressive intentions" and called for resumption of four-
                                                 
586 www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=12813 
587 www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-caucasus/abkhazia_serbia_3787.jsp 
588 www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=13141 
589 www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=13147 
590 www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=13212 
591 www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1033282.html 
592 www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1033901.html 
593 www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1034641.html 
594 www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=13190 
 83
party meetings in Gali, but also underscored that the only acceptable result of 
negotiations was 
the restoration of the territorial integrity of Georgia, with the protection of all sides’ legitimate 
interests, with the protection of the interests of the Abkhaz nation and all the people living in 
Abkhazia (...) We should create a new, joint state model of ethnic, civil cooperation. There will be no 
compromises in this respect595 
Okruashvili, too, said that Upper Kodori was "a very important foothold on the territory 
of Abkhazia" and that the RG Gov. "constantly thinks about how to regain Abkhazia". 
In interview, Kvarcheliya claimed that at some point Saakashvili had also emphasised 
how Sokhumi was only five minutes' flight from Upper Kodori. Correct or not, this was 
cited by other people in Sokhumi, who first and foremost see a terrible threat to their 
security in the RG's presence up in the mountains. Kolstø and Blakkisrud claim that a 
"siege mentality" arose as people feared this could be a "test balloon" for a subsequent 
invasion.596 Several NGOs condemned the "invasion" and accused the Saakashvili Gov. 
of revanchism, destroying the negotiation process, refusing to sign the non-violence 
treaty, building up forces and alliances, and using rhetoric that threatened the entire 
Caucasus' stability.597 NGOs and the opposition again asked the RA Gov. to withdraw 
from negotiations, expressing concern over similarities between the Kodori Crisis and 
the beginning of 1992's "military intrusion into Abkhazian territory".598 Saakashvili's 
suggestion in the same speech that GAE should be moved out of exile and into the 
"reclaimed" area prompted the RA to say that they now did consider cutting out 
negotiations, and would use all diplomatic and military means to prevent a "marionette 
government" on their territory.599 The very next day Bagapsh appeared on Abkhazian 
television, condemning  
the so-called "police operation" (...) actually a large-scale military action on the territory of the 
Republic of Abkhazia, the main goal of which is "seizing strategically important bridgeheads" for 
future enlargement of Georgia’s military presence. Georgian officials have stated this. (…) in his 
statement [Saakashvili] clearly indicated the desire to transfer the structures of the so-called 
government in exile of the non-existent Autonomous Abkhazia. (...) such a development in the 
situation bears witness to the aggressive intentions of Georgia. And (…) has led to the discontinuing 
of the negotiation process. (…) If such a so-called government is set up in the Kodori Gorge, we will 
free ourselves from all responsibilities stemming from former agreements, and the Republic of 
Abkhazia will take all necessary steps to defend its sovereignty and the security of its society.600 
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Bagapsh threatened that they had difficulties "holding back" the RA army reservists, that 
NC "brothers" and "Abkhaz-Cherkess diasporas" had already volunteered, and that war 
would mean "a new stream of refugees" ― i.e. he threatened to make use of the hostage 
population.601 An influential RG MP termed the RA reactions "hysterical", saying that 
should they try any form of military operation a "devastating strike" would be 
launched.602 An attempted meeting to discuss the Kodori Crisis stranded when 
Kishmariya refused to participate due to the RG "intentionally disrupting" the meeting 
by including in their delegation a GAE representative.603 Shamba and Antadze met on 
the initiative of SRUNSG Jean Arno, but no progress was made: The RA insisted on full 
withdrawal of RG troops and insertion of RF PKs, whereas the RG insisted on no RF 
presence.604  
 On September 27605 Saakashvili and a host of VIPs such as Burjanadze, 
Okruashvili and the Patriarch, inaugurated the new seat of the alternative government 
formerly in exil - in the village of Chkhalta, Upper Kodori. In his speech about returning 
to "holy Abkhazia" Saakashvili framed the capture of Upper Kodori – which Tbilisi now 
renamed "Upper Abkhazia" as the beginning of Abkhazia's return to its "owners": 
[This is] the he first real example of reconstruction which has taken place on the Abkhaz land in the 
past 13 years (...) More has been done than in the past 13 years in devastated [lists other Abkhazian 
cities] (...) because it has been done by the Georgian state (...) by those to whom this land belongs. We 
are in Abkhazia and no one will ever be able to force us from here. We are in Abkhazia and Abkhazia 
belongs to Georgia. From here we are overlooking our holy land of Sokhumi (...) and our ancestors’ 
graves and no one will ever force us from here. (...) we want to say that we have peaceful intentions; 
we do not want war and bloodshed, but (...) our homes should be returned back to (...) those who 
have been forced to go from there 13 years ago (...) deprived of the right to go back only because their 
ethnic background does not correspond to the taste of those people who have occupied their homes 
and who have occupied the Abkhaz land. (...) We will come back to our homes very soon, we will 
come back from every direction: from the mountains, from the sea, we will cross the rivers and we 
will overcome all the obstacles and we will definitely come back. And even the most formidable 
armed forces will never be able to obstruct our aspiration towards our homes, towards our better 
future.606 
 
The specific mentioning of coming from the mountains, the sea and crossing rivers must 
have been particularly unsetteling for the RA, as it is quite easy to interpret this as 
threatening a concrete attack from three sides - the "border" between the Gali and 
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Zugdidi districts follows the Inguri river. Saakashvili also emphasised the strategic value 
of Abkhazia: 
for the first time since 1993 the government is entering into the middle of (...) our Abkhazia, to exercise 
Georgian jurisdiction and the Georgian constitutional order. (...) From now on Georgia exercises direct 
control over a very important, strategic part of Abkhaz territory…607 
 
Some days later, he launched a campaign to include ARA in all discussions around the 
Abkhazian Conflict,608 something Bagapsh dismissed as "idiocy" aimed at provoking the 
RA.609 He dismissed the RA Pres. as a "showman" and "dreamer."610 Shamba reacted by 
calling the RG Gov. "Stalinist"611 and accusing them of escalation.612 They proclaimed 
that they would not meet with diplomats who had met with the ARA structures,613 and 
when the RG inserted ARA into the CC this forum predictably collapsed due to RA 
boycotts.614 Tbilisi's calls for renewed negotiations were ignored,615 Bagapsh demanding 
withdrawal and accusing them of "throwing their relationship with us back to 1993".616 
On October 2 Sokhumi officially discontinued all negotiations until the RG "returns to 
fulfilling all parts of earlier agreements". This position has remained adamant. 617 Four-
party meetings occurred,618 but according to Kavkazkiy Uzel these were fruitless 
"sessions of mutual accusation"619 and eventually the RG stopped appointing new 
representatives.620, 621 
 RG-RF conflict intensity also rose due to the Kodori Crisis: Okruashvili accused 
the CISPK of involvement in fights in Kodori622 and RG rhetoric increasingly 
constructed both the conflicts with Sokhumi and Tskhinvali as essentially between 
Moscow and Tbilisi: According to RG Min. FA Gela Bezhuashvili Georgia's conflicts 
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with the breakaway republics were "territorial disputes and not ethnic (...) conflicts"623 
and in his September 22 speech to the UNGA, Saakashvili's main focus was on the RF – 
saying that "the painful but factual truth is that these regions are being annexed by our 
neighbour to the north", and that the CISPK makes "a farce of the time-honoured 
principles of neutrality, impartiality, and trust" by upholding a "gangster occupation" of 
RG territory. Despite this, Saakashvili said that Russia was not a party in the conflicts and 
called for demilitarization, internationalization and dialogue with the RSO and RA.624 
Next year, however, in his state of the nation address in 2007, the RG Pres. framed the 
Akbhaz as completely lacking agency in the conflict, saying the idea that this was a 
"Georgian-Akbhazian" conflict was as a "fabrication by imperial ideologists".625
 Tblisi's calls for demilitarization after investing heavily in the RGM sector and 
invading Upper Kodori were not taken very seriously in Sokhumi. By the end of the year 
a rally of thousands in Sokhumi demonstrated for independence, an event Civil Georgia 
claimed was timed to coincide with the RF Duma's debate on Georgia's breakaway 
republics. Addressing the crowd, Bagapsh said that Abkhazia and the RG would never be 
able to coexist in a united state.626 
   
9.5. 2007: Kidnappings, killings and parliamentary elections  
2007 kicked off with Saakashvili first giving a "peace meassage" underscoring the need 
for constructive dialogue627 and a few days later invoking historical battlefields in 
connection with Abkhazia 
Our Abkhazia is now ruled by the people who outrageously state that they will never let those people, 
whose ancestors are buried in Abkhazia, to return. Georgia will never tolerate to this fact (...) we are 
now (...) standing on the ground; so firmly that it is almost impossible to tumble us. We have gained 
the strength and it is now time to move forward towards final reunification. (...)  We should become 
the generation of the new Didgori (...) a generation that will be remembered for many centuries, and 
nothing will hinder us628  
And Upper Kodori was already a battlefield. In October 2007 missiles were fired against 
the village of Azhara. The RG accused the RA, but UNOMIG claimed the missiles had 
come from hillsides inside RG-controlled territory,629 and according to Civil Georgia 
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Kvitsiani later assumed responsibility.630 The troubles in the gorge continued throughout 
the winter, and on March 12 2007 the RF was accused of involvement in shelling 
Chkhalta. The RA kept claiming that all violence stemmed from conflicts between the 
local Svans and the RG authorities,631 though Kvitsiani denied all involvement this 
time.632 This was also the winter that Chakaberia and Sigua (see 8.1) were kidnapped, 
causing yet another problem to be solved before negotiations could resume.633 When 
Chakaberia was freed in April, the RA said the four-party talks could now be resumed but 
still linked higher level meetings to the RG demilitarizing Upper Kodori in accordance 
with UN Resolution 1716634 and telling them what had become of Sigua.635 
 The RA Parl. elections in March provided yet another opportunity for escalation. 
The RG was accused of being behind the paramilitaries who had harassed AG voters636 
and there were disagreements over whether citizens of Gali had voted or not: Saakashvili 
claimed they had showed "heroism" and boycotted the elections, whereas the RA said 
the local turnout had been great.637 Civil Georgia claims that only 15.000 of 60.000 
inhabitants were allowed to vote,638 while Todia said that 80% voted.639 She claimed that 
Gali AKs "participate in the local system. But they don’t want politics. They want to live 
in peace and have proper documents."640 During the elections, a group of students from 
Zugdidi were caught on RA-controlled territory and arrested, causing a hunger strike in 
their hometown.641 Antadze was sent to negotiate for their release, and though they at 
first demanded Sigua's return in exchange, they eventually released the students on May 
3. The students were awarded "the Order of Courage" by Saakashvili in person.642 One 
year later a similar incident, involving a group of journalists, occurred. This time, 
Saakashvili went straight for the big guns instead of sending diplomats, telling the RA 
that they should release the journalists or face a police action. The RA Pres' spokesman 
said that Bagapsh did not find such "self-control lacking outcries" worthy of 
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comment.643 In the end, RG mass media published a joint denounciation of violent 
means of conflict solution and implored their RA colleagues to intervene. The RG 
journalists were released not much later, expressing gratitude to RA journalists.644  
 On August 22 2007 the so-called "Kodori UFO" incident occurred: An 
niden
The Anti-Saakashvili Rallies 
easingly hostile RG Gov. rhetoric against the 
                                                
u tified object got shot down and crashed in Upper Kodori, causing a forest fire. The 
RG claimed it was an RF aircraft that had opened fire against their soldiers,645 one RA 
official clamed it was space debris,646 the leader of the RA's armed forces first claimed it 
was a US spy plane but later denied having said this,647 Shamba said he assumed it to be 
an RG spy plane, and the RF denounced it all as RG propaganda.648 Interestingly, so did 
the RG Labour Party – saying it was Saakashvili's attempt to unite people against an 
outside enemy.649 A mere month later there was a gunfight between RG and RA forces in 
the RA side of the SZ, that saw two RA personnel killed and seven taken as captives to 
Zugdidi.650 On October 25 Shamba met with new Min. CR David Bakradze, and the 
prisoners were released.651 The RA called the incident a "terrorist attack"652 and claimed 
the soldiers had been tortured.653 
   
9.6. Fall 2007: 
The opposition rallies of 2007 saw an incr
RA. Already the day after Okruashvili's speech Saakashvili paid a visit to Upper Kodori 
where he promised to "unite Georgia" by 2009.654 In November, he said that IDPs would 
be able to return safely to Abkhazia within months.655 At the height of tensions, the RG 
Gov. began a "war scare" claiming that the RF had sent heavy military material into East 
Abkhazia - later refuted by SRUNSG).656 In December, faced with complaints over the 
RG's socio-economic problems, Saakashvili even attempted to link these issues with the 
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Abkhazian Conflict ― saying that "reintegration" of Abkhazia would mean "the doubling 
of all families’ income, much more security and much greater prospects."657 
 My general impression from being in Abkhazia during the unrest in Tbilisi is that 
the events served to confirm long held beliefs about Saakashvili's democracy, and some 
took the opportunity to contrast it with the RA's assumed more favourable democratic 
situation. One of these was Kvarcheliya, though not without one caveat: "Generally, there 
is more freedom here, I think, than under Saakashvili. But I think there is less corruption 
in Georgia – on the low and middle level, not on the top level."658 Interestingly, this 
admiraton for Saakashvili's efforts against corruption was also volunteered by Gvindzhiya 
– despite this interview being done in a period of high tensions: 
It’s almost impossible in Georgia [to eradicate corruption] but [Saakashvili] did manage to do it on the 
lower level. In the police. That’s good. But when he starts creating problems with his neighbours, 
Abkhazia and South Osssetia, making patriotic military camps in the conflict zone, spends a lot of 
money on the military [pauses] He is openly saying that he will come and kill all of us. 
 
In a later interview, Bagapsh used these events to exemplify what he claimed to be a 
general hypocricy from Tbilisi's side:  
Do you remember the incident where two Georgian journalists were arrested in Abkhazia? (...) It was 
tearfully amusing to hear these speeches about [his] concern for his own citizens, particularly after the 
crushing of a peaceful demonstration in Tbilisi and the special forces' armed seizing of [Imedi] (...) 
With them, it's always double standards – one for themselves and one for external use.659 
 
Bagapsh also accused the RG Gov. of a "tendency to solve internal problems (...) by 
uniting society around confrontation with Abkhazia and South Ossetia",660 an 
interpretation also articulated by Gvindzhiya: 
Journalists from Georgia called me about [RF troops being moved into East Abkhazia] and I told 
them that before the Iraq War, Georgian politicians said that they had solid evidence that Iraq had 
weapons of mass destruction (...) President Saakashvili now only wants to turn the blame on anyone 
else (...) Abkhazia and Russia. This is a good move to shift the attention from internal to external 
problems. People in Georgia must be united by external enemies, Saakashvili thinks.661 
 
The events also created ample opportunity to articulate the discourse on inherently unstable 
Georgia: Bagapsh said that the "political system in Georgia is extremely volatile. The basis 
of the system is permanent revolutions. It is very difficult to deal with such a partner".662 
Gvindzhiya also invoked this discourse: "Unfortunately, they have never elected a 
President. Always these coup d’etats. Gamsakhurdia (...), Shevardnadze and now 
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Saakashvili will be overthrown, we have no doubt."663 The Deputy Min. FA was 
particularly worried about a scenario where Burjanadze usurped power, as he considered 
her more aggressive than Saakashvili. 
 In principle the RA did not support any side in the power struggle – like during 
the Rose Revolution - but certain officials did voice opinions. Parl. Speaker Nuzgar 
Ashuba somewhat suprisingly told the press that he wanted Saakashvili to win due to his 
experience - though he felt Gachechiladze was a "sympathetic person"664  and had no 
trust in Saakashvili.665 Gvindzhiya, however, said he would prefer an opposition 
candidate since such a person would probably roll back military investments and spend 
money on welfare, while NGO activist and political scientist Leliya Taniya believed 
Saakashvili's re-election could heighten "the risk of a violent scenario". In any case she 
brushed off the RG attempt at democracy as "a typical example of a marionette state that 
exists due to external financial influence".666  
 It should be mentioned that while Okruashvili as an alternative leader of the RG 
does not give much hope for the RA, there are actually less "hardliner" elements in RG 
politics. Already in 2005 David Darchiashvili wrote an article that attacked "the 
widespread view [that] a "good cop ― bad cop" position is justified if we want to push the 
other side into cooperation (...) by threatening the Abkhazians, we will only help Russia to 
achieve its goals."667  Darchiashvili suggested that the RG should commit to only using 
violence in case of "mass repression" (presumably against AKs); and de-link the difficult 
IDP issue from all other questions. He also argued that the RG should apologize for 
bringing "the tanks into Sokhumi" in an attempt to unify Kartvelians against an Abkhaz 
enemy image.668 The latter cause was taken up in late 2006 by a minor opposition party669 
that was later accused by the RG Gov. of cooperating with Russia.670 In 2007 a group of 
RG NGOs started the campaign "Sorry"with the goal of teaching Kartvelians about 
Abkhaz culture and making the RG Gov. apologize "for each bullet that was shot and for 
every word that caused the war". The leaders of the group said that they knew the 
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campaign would be "controversial", among other things due to the large IDP presence in 
the de facto RG. Despite some negative reactions (among others from Saakashvili, who 
called the campaign "a stance of capitulation")671 the network is still active in several 
cities, among those Zugdidi.672 While possibly making some grass root impacts, the 
campaign has not managed to reduce popular intensity. It serves to prove, though, that 
there is some internal opposition to the increasingly high RGint ― while unfortunately on 
the Abkhaz side there is to my knowledge not any group that argues the RA should 
apologize for ethnic cleansing.  
 
9.7. Spring 2008: The Kosovo Effect and the "Drone Wars" 
As if chances for renewed negotiations were not narrow enough with the Kodori Crisis, 
the Sigua case, the problem with ARA and the rivalry over what documents to base 
negotiations on; Saakashvili after being re-elected renamed the MCR the Ministry of 
Reintegration – a name the RA found so insulting that Shamba said they would never meet 
with people from these structures even if the RG fulfilled all its duties according to the 
Moscow Accords.673 In February the RK's declaration of independence and the RF 
handling of the Georgian statelets' appeal for recognition, caused conflict intensity to 
increase even more – also between Tbilisi and Moscow, of course. The day after the RK 
declared independence Shamba openly stated that things were now up to Russia: "The 
Russian MFA has a few variants. [Soon they] will choose the path which will lead to 
recognition of Abkhazia's independence."674 When the RF decided to formalize relations 
with Abkhazia, the rest of the GF implored them to reconsider due to the effects this 
would have on regional stability,675 and when not  much later the RA/RF started 
shooting down RG drones, tensions did explode: Saakashvili held a speech "to our 
Abkhazian and Ossetian brothers and sisters" that at first glance seems an olive branch 
to the secessionist nations, but could not possibly have been intended as such. The RG 
Pres. started off by inflating the IDPs' numbers to 450.000-500.000 and expressed 
sympathy for the Abkhaz and Ossetians who have to "live under the reign of separatist, 
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corrupted and criminal groups", who are "forced to watch (...) false reports" on their TVs 
and are prevented by Russia from choosing Georgia. "It was not your choice to live this 
way," he asserted. Finally, he defined the secession conflicts as a "global conflict" which 
he does "not want that even one Abkhazian and Ossetian is involved in" – in other 
words redefining the entire Abkhazian Conflict as an RG-RF affair or even a NATO-RF 
affair, and removing all agency from the Abkhaz and Ossetians. Had the current RA 
leadership been unpopular among the Akbhaz, and Saakashvili a man they trusted ― this 
appeal might have worked. But Abkhazia is not Ajara. Under present conditions such a 
speech not only raises RGint but also RAint, RFint and RSOint. On May 6 2008 Min. of 
Reintegration Temur Iakobashvili warned that Russia and Georgia were now "very close" 
to war" over Abkhazia.676 
 
 
10. Conclusion 
In the period under analysis we have seen two periods of detente: A very minor one 
immediately following the Rose Revolution, and a very long one following the "Tangerine 
Revolution." In the first case, there was always a certain tension between Ardzinba's Gov. 
and Saakashvili's Gov, and Sokhumi's trust in the "Rose Revolutionaries" was lowered 
due to the incorporation of Ajara against the local elite's wishes and subsequent 
imposition of "nominal" autonomy despite earlier promises; and the subsequent 
skirmishes in South Ossetia. The marine incident in the summer of 2004 was just the final 
drop. By comparison, the relationship between Saakashvili's Gov. and Bagapsh' Gov. was 
much better initially. There were setbacks – notably another maritime incident in the 
summer of 2005 and the RA's string of provocations in the following fall ― but in 
hindsight this was not all that dramatic: Negotiations were resumed rapidly after the 
maritime incident, and the statements by Alasania and Lakoba suggest a constructive 
mood even during the troubled fall. But when real conflicts of interest became to show, 
the parties faced problems due to their mutual lack of will to compromise. The most 
problematic issues: IDP return and the CISPK's presence. That the latter issue has led to 
such problems is particularly unnecessary since that problem actually has its roots in the 
relationship between the RG and Russia, not in the basic RA-RG conflict. The mounting 
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tensions between Tbilisi and Moscow, coupled with the RA's exclusive trust in – and 
dependency on ― Russia has made it a lot harder for the parties to reach NA than it could 
have been. The subsequent Kodori Crisis served to end a detente that was constructive 
though riddled with problems. Who conspired with whom in this situation is difficult to 
say, but in any case anyone could have foretold that the military path chosen by the RG 
would increase tensions. The ensuing symbolic-political moves such as renaming Upper 
Kodori and staging grand patriotic speeches with a distinctive military tang there, and 
promising IDPs that return to Abkhazia was just around the corner; all seemed almost 
tailor-made to raise RAint. One may indeed wonder if the RG by this time had really given 
up "conflict resolution" to the benefit of unconditional "reintegration" – such as the 
renaming of the MCR would indicate - for how could they expect Sokhumi to accept all 
this? Assuming that Tbilisi acts rationally, they must have decided that the only thing that 
works against Sokhumi is lowering RABATNA – military means being the most accessible 
way of doing this. Latter symbolic moves are more difficult to explain as rational, unless 
one assumes them to be aimed at improving RGS through "success stories" such as 
moving the ARA headquarters back into Abkhazia and giving the Kartvelians a feeling of 
steady progress towards return to "holy Abkhazia". Possibly, the RG also believes the RA 
can be scared into negotiating – which is simply not the case, since the RA can go to 
Russia for help when conflict with the RG looms. Tbilisi's "drive" against Abkhazia in 
both rhetoric and action has made the RA willing to even invite Moscow to take full 
military control over their "country" – despite the breakaway republic being led by a 
President who came to power fighting uphill against RF involvement.  
  The RF has done its part to increase Tbilisi's frustration, and provided fuel to their 
increasingly aggressive stance against the Georgian statelets. Like in the Kodori Crisis, 
hard facts are elusive when it comes to "UFOs" moving illegally over RG airspace and 
sometimes even attacking – but assuming that the RG is not putting on a gigantic PR 
show, then the RF is responsible for making Tbilisi perceive that its most important 
conflict at the moment is with Russia, and that Abkhazia is just an aspect of this greater 
conflict. And thus, they do exactly what Darchiashvili warned them not to: Treating 
Abkhazia like it is not really the party Tbilisi needs to talk to. The current situation may be 
exactly what Russia desires, assuming that its goal is to maximise its control over 
Caucasian affairs (or at least keep anyone else from becoming the regional hegemon): An 
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RG that sees the solution to their internal conflicts in Moscow and not Sokhumi and 
Tskhinvali, and an RA that perceives itself to be under basic existential threat from Tbilisi 
and has nobody else to borrow power from than Russia. 
 At present, RABATNA cannot be said to be unsatisfactory according to the criteria 
outlined in Ch.2.677 RAD in principle makes the Abkhaz weak vis-à-vis the Kartvelians 
and even the Armenians, but the Abkhaz remain better off than prior to the war and this 
situation is in practice safeguarded by the RF promise of defending the RA. The fact that 
any NA would most likely include a weakened RAD position weakens the RA's wish to 
reach NA at all. RAE has gotten steadily better throughout the period, raising RABATNA 
further. This source of growth, however, is also dependent on Russia. RAM is unilaterally 
weaker vis-à-vis the RG military now than in 2004, but the RF guarantees their security. 
RAR can be said to have gotten marginally better in practice through the RF's "semi-
recognition", but all in all this is still the area where the Abkhaz have most to gain from 
reaching NA – which would most likely provide them with more formal rights to RAdU 
than is outlined in the Moscow Accords' baseline of Constiution and state symbols. 
Finally, RAS had big problems at the outset and reached a dramatic low during the 
Tangerine Revolution, but at the end of the day has improved because of the victory of 
the popular pro-democratic bloc. However, there are still major potentials for instability. 
Thus, the general picture of RABATNA is that of a status quo that is both acceptable and 
improving – but still dependent on the RF. This dependency also makes NA less 
desirable, since current relations between Tbilisi and Moscow indicate that accepting 
unification with the RG implies breaking with Russia. Since RABATNA is currently good 
and getting better, it would be irrational for the RA to actively seek an armed conflict with 
Tbilisi at this point, but they have very few incentives to negotiate.  
 RGBATNA, on the contrary, has become unsatisfactory. RGD makes the current 
situation dificult due to the IDP presence and the general fear of disintegration, but there 
has been no change for the worse here. RGE has been rapidly improving and the tendency 
does not seem to be stopping. In principle, that should make NA more desirable for the 
RA, but their ties to Russia and the generally high conflict intensity cancels this effect out. 
RGM has been substantially boosted and is set to rise even more, but this does not really 
                                                 
677 None or little control over the dU and no or little capability to gain control through military means, and/or an obvious 
tendency of losing status quo control or potential for seizing control over the dU. 
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have any positive effects on the conflict for Tbilisi: The RG will never be able to compete 
with Russia unilaterally, and their military spending and strategic victories heighten 
conflict intensity. RGR is in principle as good as it used to be, but Russia's steps towards 
the Georgian statelets causes worry in Tbilisi, and the RG's words and deeds in the wake 
of continued RA-RF integration have also served to raise conflict intensity. As for RGS, 
this sector was enormously strengthened at the outset of the period due to the popularity 
of Saakashvili and the UNM, and the incorporation of Ajara - but the discontent that built 
up and was "released" in November 2007 means the tendency must now be seen as 
rapidly falling. The RGS situation has increased conflict intensity as the RG has employed 
increasingly "hard" rhetoric against the RA since the Anti-Saakashvili rallies. Summing it 
up; the RG does not have the capacity to take full control over RGdU as the self-declared 
states' territories are withheld from them and they do not have the power to return the 
IDPs, and there is an obvious tendency towards less control over RGdU in general as 
social cohesion drops. Their attempt at finding an alternative source of control in NATO 
has not given them much more muscle in the issues at hand. Seeking to increase control 
over RGdU through military means would only be rational if the RG truly believes in 
"Western" assitance during full conflict, and/or that Russia will default on its vows to 
protect Abkhazia. However, as the RG's social cohesion becomes lower and their fears 
for losing Abkhazia for good higher – to Russia, as they increasingly perceive it – chances 
for the RG taking "desperate measures" grow. Saakashvili has committed over and over 
again to gathering the "lost territories" and returning the IDPs, making both the people 
and quite a few opposition politicans impatient. 
 In Ch. 2 I proposed the following general values for different constellations of 
BATNAs and intensity:  
 
 Intensity rising Imbalance Intensity falling 
Equally satisfied Rather unstable Somewhat unstable Highly progressive. 
Imbalance Highly unstable. Dependent on 
constellation: (B) is 
somewhat  progressive 
and (A) is somewhat 
unstable. 
Rather progressive. 
Equally dissatisfied Rather unstable Somewhat unstable. Rather progressive 
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I wish to repat that such an abstract simplification necessarily leaves a lot to be desired 
since the myriad of important details can never be captured by it, but I feel that the table 
still manages to say something about this concrete conflict and its development from 
2004 – 2008. I find that during the period under analysis, the Abkhazian Conflict has 
gone through the following constellations:  
 Intensity rising Imbalance  Intensity falling 
BATNAs equally 
satisfactory 
5) Kodori crisis – Anti-
Saakashvili rallies: 
RAint and RGint 
increasing rapidly, but 
nobody's BATNA is 
getting worse, despite 
the RG's capturing of 
Upper Kodori. 
3) Fall of 2005: BATNAs 
still climbing, RAint and 
RGint somewhat raised – 
particularly RGint – but 
only marginally. 
 
 
 
2) From the Tangerine 
Revolution to the 
summer/fall of 2005: 
BATNAs mutually 
increasing, intensities 
decreasing 
 
4) Spring 2006 – 
Kodori Crisis: 
BATNAs improving, 
intensities decreasing. 
The most constructive 
part of the conflict, 
though disagreements 
arose at the end of the 
period. 
 
Imbalance 6) Anti-Saakashvili 
rallies – Today: 
RABATNA still 
improving, but 
RGBATNA falling due to 
decreased social 
cohesion and increased 
RA-RF integration. 
Mutually increasing 
intensities. 
1) From the outset to the 
Tangerine Revolution: 
RGBATNA improving (and 
thus satisfactory) and 
RGint quite stable. 
RABATNA weakening (and 
thus unsatisfactory), RAint 
rising. To follow the 
generalization this is 
despite tensions the 
"somewhat progressive" 
scenario, since the 
stronger party is the least 
intense one. 
 
BATNAs equally 
unsatisfactory 
   
 
In other words, the Abkhazian Conflict has gone from what I consider to be a less than 
critical situation (1), via a period where there was high potential for progress (2,4) despite 
a small temporary "heating" of the conflict (3), but since the Kodori Crisis the tendency 
has fallen towards the least desirable sectors of the table (5,6) and is today "highly 
unstable". I hold three structural factors to be the main causes that we have ended up 
here: 
• The RA's complete lack of will to compromise on the IDP issue and the 
sovereignty issue, which is caused by their high RABATNA and lacking trust in Tbilisi 
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(i.e. high RAint). Their constant insistence on having both of these desires fulfilled 
raise RGint and reduce the RG's incentives to pursue the path of negotiation, as this 
is increasingly seen as futile. This heightens the RG's incentives to prepare military 
action - if not for any other reason, then simply in order to have credible threat in 
the absence of positive responses to offers that they see as generous.  
• The increased military spending and activity of the RG, and many unproductive 
symbolic actions such as moving the GAE into Upper Kodori and renaming the 
Ministry of Conflict Resolution. This has raised RAint by lowering their trust in 
Tbilisi and increasing their fears - causing them to seek more integration with the 
RF. 
• The RF's increased sponsorship of Abkhazia, which has raised RABATNA, lowered 
RGBATNA and raised RGint. This sponsorship is again linked to increasing rivalry 
between the RF and USA/NATO, and the RG's increasing orientation towards this 
latter bloc following the Rose Revolution. 
None of these structural factors seem to be disappearing in the moment of writing: 
RABATNA is still improving and they recently said no to the best offer they have gotten 
from Saakashvili so far; the RG's military power and actions, plus their bellicose rhetoric 
is becoming even more pronounced; and the RF's conflict with the RG is still ongoing. At 
present, the conflict is completely locked. While the RA may hypothetically come to terms 
with the fact that ARA is now based in Abkhazia, they can not accept the RG's new 
strategic position that enables them to move in wit forces from the northeast, the Black 
Sea and the southeast simultaneously ― like Saakashvili even more-or-less openly have 
threatened. For Saakashvili's Gov, retracting the forces from Upper Kodori is hardly an 
option under current circumstances: That would fly in the face of all former rhetoric 
about "returning to Abkhazia", and would be unwise in a situation of low social cohesion 
– parts of the opposition would seize the opportunity to attack him for this. It is possible 
that a new RG Pres, with more popular legitimacy and other ideas about the Abkhazian 
Conflict, is needed to approach the Upper Kodori problem in a new way. But by the time 
someone like this comes to power in Tbilisi, the RA may already have lost much of its de 
facto sovereignty to Russia because of the events we are seeing unfold now, that increase 
their dependence. Then, the RG may have to deal with the RF instead of the RA. 
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